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ABSTRACT 
THREE ESSAYS IN APPLIED LABOR ECONOMICS 
 
by 
 
Jessica L. Milli 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013 
Under the Supervision of Professor Scott Drewianka 
 
 
 
The goal of this dissertation is to apply theoretical and empirical methodologies used 
in the field of labor economics to analyze several topics which have clear policy 
implications.  
Chapter 1 analyzes the relationship between domestic violence and welfare receipt in 
a more rigorous framework than has been previously possible. It is well documented 
that there is a strong relationship between abuse and welfare receipt and the 
assumption has predominantly been that welfare receipt affects the risk of 
victimization. I show that the direction of impact actually runs in the opposite 
direction. This finding is critical in light of the welfare reforms of the 1990’s. I find 
that violence decreased the likelihood of using welfare services prior to the reforms, 
and that this effect is even larger after the reforms took place. However, this negative 
effect is drastically reduced in the presence of the Family Violence Option. 
Chapter 2 broadens the analysis of domestic violence to include women of all income 
levels. Specifically, I look at how the decision to participate in the workforce affects 
abuse levels and vice versa. Because attitudes towards domestic violence and 
women’s working status likely vary by income levels, I analyze the relationship in 
both low and high income households. I find that for women with low income 
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spouses, employment increases the likelihood of abuse, however, for women with 
high income spouses, employment decreases the likelihood of abuse.  
Chapter 3 attempts to reconcile the observed educational attainment gap between 
black and white workers with the monetary returns to education literature which 
predicts that black individuals have higher monetary incentives to invest. I examine 
the returns to education in a broader sense: the job satisfaction returns to education. I 
find that job satisfaction is actually declining in education for black workers. Further, 
it is found that education does not improve the ability of black workers to transition 
into new jobs that they like better. These results suggest that higher education may 
create expectations that are not being met by black workers, and one potential 
explanation for this is that covert discrimination still exists in the workplace. 
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Chapter 1: “Domestic Violence and Welfare Receipt: Determining the Nature of 
the Relationship in the Pre- and Post -Welfare Reform Eras” 
 
Introduction 
 The welfare system has the potential to provide women in low income 
households who are victims of domestic violence with the resources necessary to 
become self-sufficient and ultimately enable them to leave their abusive partners. It is 
because of this potential use of the welfare system that advocates for domestic 
violence victims were concerned about the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 [1996]), 
which dramatically changed the structure of the welfare system. Among the changes 
that took place were a reduction in the length of time that individuals and households 
could receive benefits and stricter working requirements for receiving aid. The worry 
was that these changes would make the system even more inaccessible to abused 
women and reduce their outside options (Hetling [2000]). An optional provision 
called the Family Violence Option (FVO) was proposed because of this concern, 
which would allow states that adopted it to waive some of the requirements of the 
program for individuals who identified themselves as victims of abuse. Because of the 
potential policy implications, it is thus critical to understand the relationship between 
domestic violence and welfare receipt.  
 It is well documented that there is a significant overlap between women who 
are victims of abuse and women who are recipients of welfare assistance. In 1992 the 
Washington State Institute for Public Policy’s “Family Income Study” found that 60 
percent of AFDC recipients were also victims of domestic abuse. However, there are 
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currently many aspects of this relationship that are not understood. Among the 
questions are whether the act of receiving welfare has an effect on domestic violence 
levels, if violence has an effect on welfare take-up, or if both are due to unobserved 
factors. Underlying much of the analysis is a lack of understanding of the motives 
behind the use of domestic violence. Is violence, for example, used as an instrument 
to deter certain behaviors? 
Most of the existing literature has assumed that welfare receipt affects 
domestic violence rates, though other theoretical models offer competing views of the 
relationship. In one view, welfare receipt may provoke violence because it may be 
seen as an act of defiance and an attempt to leave (see Raphael and Tolman [1997] for 
example), or, as Kurz (1989) suggests, it may deter violence because the woman has 
gained more bargaining power in the relationship and the spouse or partner does not 
want to lose those additional resources. Alternatively, domestic violence may push a 
woman into welfare possibly because she is no longer able to hold a job, or perhaps as 
a means to gather resources to leave the relationship. These two variables may also 
affect each other simultaneously.  
Thus far the empirical literature has not reached a consensus as to the sign and 
the direction of the relationship. This owes largely to the fact that data have been 
severely limited. Ideally the dataset should be nationally representative, have 
individual level data on both welfare receipt and domestic violence, and span a period 
of time that includes both the pre and post reform eras. Various studies have used data 
that satisfy some of these conditions, but none have been able to satisfy all of them. 
This paper examines the empirical relationship between domestic violence and 
welfare receipt. One of its main contributions is to take a theoretically agnostic 
approach and test multiple theoretical models of the relationship instead of assuming 
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one particular model. To do so, it uses data from the National Survey of Families and 
Households (NSFH) that contains individual-level data on both domestic violence and 
welfare receipt. Although this data has been used in several previous studies of 
domestic violence, until now it has not been utilized to analyze its relationship with 
welfare receipt. The dataset also allows for the relationship to be studied using 
appropriate estimation techniques that allow for potential mutual dependence between 
the two variables, and its timing enables us to evaluate how the relationship changed 
after the reforms took place. Ultimately we reject the model previously assumed in the 
literature and find that the direction of causality is the opposite of what was supposed. 
In particular, domestic violence is found to have a strong negative effect on welfare 
receipt, which is at odds with the positive correlation that is typically found in the 
sociology literature but consistent with some of the findings of the economics 
literature. 
This finding is troubling because it has negative implications for the effect of 
the welfare reforms on abused women. If women viewed the welfare system as being 
inaccessible because of their circumstances even before the reforms took place, the 
changes to the welfare system would make it even less likely for women to use 
welfare as a means to leave abusive relationships. While the presence of the FVO is 
found to significantly increase the likelihood that an abused woman will go on 
welfare, it does not completely eliminate the negative impact of abuse on welfare 
receipt. This suggests that further policy changes are necessary if welfare is to be 
considered a means for escaping abuse. Possible solutions may be to increase the 
amount of aid that victims can receive, making the FVO mandatory for every state, 
and increasing the number of programs aimed at helping women become self-
sufficient that are available. 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 1 discusses the 
relevant legislative history and empirical literature, section 2 presents several 
hypothesized relationships between welfare and domestic violence and proposes a 
method for selecting between empirical models, section 3 describes the data used, 
section 4 details the model selection process, section 5 presents the results, and 
section 6 concludes. 
 
1. Background 
1.1 Legislative History 
 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996 (P.L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 [1996]) was motivated by a growing concern 
about the dependency of welfare-receiving poor. The law instituted the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program to replace the Aid for Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC). The main goal was to make welfare a transition to work 
so that families could ultimately become self-sufficient. Major provisions included 
imposing stricter work requirements, limiting the lifetime benefits that households can 
receive, providing aid to families transitioning to work, and allowing states to use 
funds that would have gone to welfare checks to create public jobs or to provide 
hiring incentives to potential employers (Administration for Children and Families, 
1996). 
 Specifically, the law stated that families could receive welfare payments for a 
maximum of two consecutive years before they must enter the workforce. Many states 
chose even narrower time frames for assistance. These welfare benefits could be 
renewed at a later date, but the lifetime maximum number of years was limited to only 
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five cumulative years. The law also increased the amount of aid given to families for 
child care by $3.5 billion in order to allow mothers to transition into the workforce 
more easily. Finally, the law allowed states greater liberty to use their funds for other 
initiatives aimed at increasing employment such as using part of their funds to create 
jobs for welfare recipients.  
 One concern that arose was that victims of domestic violence may not be able 
to meet the new TANF workforce participation requirement, either because physical 
signs of abuse may be a hindrance to employment or because the level of violence 
may escalate if the woman chooses to participate in the program. In response, the 
Family Violence Option (FVO) was created to provide temporary exemptions to the 
TANF requirements for victims of domestic violence or those at risk of such violence 
(Legal Momentum [2004]). This concern demonstrates the importance of this study: a 
proper policy response requires a clear understanding of the relationship between 
welfare and abuse.  
1.2 Literature 
This relationship garnered much attention particularly after the reforms of 
1996. Prior studies of the relationship have been primarily of a theoretical nature, and 
data limitations have heretofore restricted most empirical studies to calculating 
correlations between welfare receipt and domestic violence. A few have modeled the 
relationship, but only by assuming a particular direction of causality—that welfare 
receipt affects domestic violence rates. 
 The earliest correlation studies found a very strong positive correlation 
between welfare receipt and domestic violence (see “The Worcester Family Research 
Project” or “The Effects of Violence on Women’s Employment” for example). These 
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early studies were very limited in their analysis largely because of the nature of the 
data that was used. Datasets were typically constrained to a small region of the U.S., 
and many were limited only to women who were on welfare or were victims of abuse. 
It was thus not clear whether the higher prevalence of domestic violence among 
welfare recipients was because these women come from low-income households that 
tend to be more violent, because the simple act of receiving welfare is interpreted by 
an abuser as an act of defiance and an attempt to leave the relationship, because 
domestic violence motivates women to enter the welfare system in order to gain the 
necessary resources to leave, or because victims are no longer able to work.   
Several studies have since emerged that attempt to get at the causal 
relationship between domestic violence and welfare. Even before the 1996 welfare 
reforms, Tauchen, Witte and Long (1991) examined data from interviews with 125 
women in Santa Barbara County, California who had been physically abused by their 
partners in 1982 and 1983 and found women who received larger AFDC benefits 
experienced fewer violent incidents, which stands in contrast to the simpler 
correlation studies.  
Nou and Timmins (2005) and Farmer and Tiefenthaler (2003) find the 
opposite relationship, consistent with the results of the basic studies discussed above. 
These studies improved upon previous studies in that they used national-level data 
and attempted to model the relationship in a way that was previously impossible. Nou 
and Timmins examine the relationship at the state level and found that higher 
proportions of households receiving welfare corresponded to higher rates of domestic 
violence. Farmer and Tiefenthaler found similar results utilizing individual-level data 
on domestic violence, but were limited to studying the effects of state-level welfare 
variables such as the average monthly welfare payment.  
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 Clearly data sources that can be used to study this relationship have been 
limited thus far and no Economics studies have been able to pinpoint the relationship 
between welfare receipt and domestic violence on an individual level. In addition, no 
study has yet been able to address the potentially complex relationship between 
domestic violence and welfare receipt. The analysis that follows attempts to model 
this complex relationship using data from a source new to the Economics literature to 
get closer to the true relationship between the two variables.  
 
2. Theory 
 
 While the empirical literature has focused primarily on how welfare receipt 
affects domestic violence rates, there is good reason to suspect that the relationship is 
much more complicated. After all, it also makes sense that domestic violence may 
influence a woman’s choice of whether to go on welfare. There are also a number of 
other important pieces of information that we do not know.  
We don’t know what the male’s objectives are when considering using violence 
and if he is more likely to achieve these objectives through violence. Three plausible 
goals seem at odds. 1) He may gain utility from keeping the relationship intact, and 
thus may use violence to motivate the partner to remain. 2) He also may want to 
maintain the dominant position in the household, i.e. have the most bargaining power; 
working and/or welfare payments increase the wife’s bargaining power, and if he 
feels threatened he may use abuse to prevent it. 3) It is also possible that he wants to 
“buy” certain behaviors from her, i.e. if she is doing something of which he doesn’t 
approve, he may use violence as an instrument to get her to stop.  
Similarly we don’t know what the female’s objectives are when considering 
going on welfare. She too may gain utility from keeping the relationship intact and 
8 
 
 
pleasing her partner, and she wants to minimize the level of violence, which may 
mean not choosing welfare or using welfare as a means of increasing her threat point 
and bargaining power. On the other hand, she may go on welfare as a way to acquire 
resources that would enable her to leave the relationship.  
It is also unclear whether the relationship between domestic violence and 
welfare is driven by the actual presence of violence and welfare receipt, or rather by 
underlying conditions that are correlated with one or both. To explore the possibilities 
more fully, consider the following system of equations: 
(1)                    
        
(2)                    
        
where D* is a latent variable that indicates the underlying state of a relationship, and 
D is an indicator that takes a value of 1 (indicating a violent relationship) if     . 
W* is a latent variable that represents the temptation to use welfare, and W is an 
indicator which takes a value of 1 (indicating receipt of welfare benefits) if    . 
X is a vector of variables that influence both violence and welfare receipt, Y a vector 
of variables that influence only violence, and Z a vector of variables that influence 
only welfare receipt. The error terms   and   may be correlated as well, possibly 
because unobserved factors affect both outcomes, which will motivate a bivariate 
probit model in the empirical implementation.  
 This system nests several potential relationships between violence and welfare 
receipt. We are particularly interested in the coefficients   ,   ,   , and   . Each may 
or may not be equal to zero, depending on whether the associated mechanism is 
empirically relevant.  
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2.1 Equation (1): How welfare receipt may affect violence. 
 Equation (1) suggests that not only the act of receiving welfare, but the 
temptation to use welfare as well, can potentially influence whether a woman 
experiences abuse. Theory unfortunately does not help us determine how these two 
variables might actually affect domestic violence since the direction of causality is 
unclear. 
 For example, if a woman chooses to receive welfare benefits her partner may 
respond by either becoming abusive or becoming more abusive (   > 0). Perhaps the 
male is abusive to extract some of the money from the welfare benefits, or 
alternatively he may feel threatened that his partner’s receipt of welfare may cause an 
imbalance in bargaining power, leading him to become violent in order to stop her use 
of welfare. Women in these situations likely have very low incomes and thus little 
bargaining power in the relationship, so welfare benefits may not give them sufficient 
income to leave the relationship. Since the partner feels threatened by her attempt or 
meditated attempt to leave, and since he knows that she will not be able to leave if she 
persists, he may use abuse to deter her from continuing to receive welfare benefits, 
although this strategy may necessitate some sort of transfer payment to the woman to 
help support herself. Her marginal utility of consumption is high, so she will forego 
some utility from abuse in exchange for more utility from consumption. A similar 
logic can be applied to explaining why the temptation to use welfare services might 
increase the level of violence in a relationship (    ). This is consistent with what 
sociologists call “exchange theory” (see Farmer and Tiefenthaler [1997], Tauchen, 
Witte and Long [1991], and Aizer [2010] for further discussion).  
 It is also possible that receiving welfare may actually decrease the level of 
abuse (   < 0). In this case the women likely have relatively high incomes compared 
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to their spouse and thus more bargaining power. If the woman persists in obtaining 
the additional income that welfare provides, she would have enough resources to 
leave the relationship if she chooses. Her partner also knows this. If her income is 
already high, he cannot offer her a transfer payment in exchange for abuse because 
her marginal utility of consumption is too low. Since he also wants to keep the 
relationship intact (and perhaps to maintain access to her resources), he may choose 
low levels of violence or no violence at all. Again, a similar rationale can be applied 
to the case where     , only in that case it is the potential welfare payment, rather 
than actual receipt, that causes the preemption.  
2.2 Equation (2): How violence may affect welfare receipt. 
 Less often discussed in the literature, Equation (2) suggests that domestic 
violence as well as the underlying state of the relationship may influence whether a 
woman chooses to receive welfare. Such an effect again may plausibly work in either 
direction. 
 For example, if the underlying state of the relationship is bad (D* is high) or 
the relationship is actually abusive (D=1), a woman may choose to go on welfare (   
and    > 0). Because adding welfare to her stock of resources may enable her to leave 
the relationship if she chooses, she can use welfare or the threat of welfare as a 
method of raising her threat point and deterring violence in the future. Or it may be 
the case that originally the woman was working and the male felt threatened by it and 
used abuse to signal his disapprobation, causing her to withdraw from the workforce 
and use welfare to subsist. It is also possible that if the relationship is significantly bad 
or abusive, a woman may elect not to receive welfare payments (   and    < 0). For 
example, if the abusive spouse does not want the woman to be on welfare, and if 
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welfare payments were insufficient to enable her to leave, then abuse may deter the 
woman from welfare take-up. 
 It is also important to note that unobserved factors could also be responsible 
for a correlation between domestic violence and welfare receipt, even if        
       . Indeed, it is possible that the correlation between the two can be non-
zero because of a correlation between the two error terms. 
2.3 Model Selection Procedure  
While some of these proposed mechanisms may seem more valid than others, 
none is entirely implausible. Instead of supposing one to be the true model, we take an 
agnostic approach to finding the correct specification. 
The system of equations cannot be properly estimated with the bivariate probit 
model when both    and    are allowed to be non-zero, however we can estimate 
different model specifications one by one assuming that either    or    are equal to 
zero. When applied to the data, this exercise should tell us which, if any, of the 
coefficients of interest are statistically significant and allow us to determine the best 
model for analyzing the relationship between violence and welfare receipt. A nice 
feature of this estimation strategy is that it also allows welfare receipt and domestic 
violence to be related even if   ,   ,   , and    are all found to be zero through the 
correlation between the error terms. 
Although the full specification of (1) and (2) cannot be estimated due to the 
identification problem noted by Heckman (1978), a simple model selection exercise 
can be implemented by assuming different combinations of our key coefficients are 
equal to zero. We start by assuming that         implying that actual violence 
and actual welfare receipt are not important in the system. We want to test whether    
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and    are significant in this model, but since W* and D* are unobservable we 
estimate    and    through different combinations of the estimated coefficients. The 
reduced form of the model is: 
(3)         
 
      
[(       )                 ] 
(4)         
 
      
[(       )                 ] 
or for simplicity:  
(5)                           
(6)                           
where     is equal to 
       
      
 for all X in the D* equation, etc., and    and    are 
composite error terms.  
Equations (5) and (6) are estimated jointly using a bivariate probit model to 
account for possible correlation between the residuals. We then identify: 
(7)       ̂  
 ̂  
 ̂  
⁄  
(8)       ̂  
 ̂  
 ̂  
⁄  
Note that this yields a separate estimate of    for each Z variable, and likewise for   . 
This allows us to test whether each estimate is significant and if the individual 
estimates are statistically equal.  
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2.3.1 Sub-models 
 Once this baseline model has been run to determine if potential welfare and 
violence have any impact, we can begin estimating other models that are also 
theoretically valid. One such model assumes that welfare receipt affects domestic 
violence, meaning that    is non-zero. This is the model that is typically found in the 
literature. In order to estimate this model, we must also assume that      due to 
coherency conditions. This gives us the following reduced form model: 
(9)         (       )                      
(10)                   
Note that if    and    are found to be insignificant, this traditional model simplifies 
to: 
(11)                       
(12)                   
Another model that is possible to estimate reverses the direction of causality 
found in the traditional model. This model proposes that domestic violence affects 
whether a woman will choose to receive welfare, but that welfare receipt has no 
impact on domestic violence. In other words,    is assumed to be non-zero. As with 
the traditional model above, we must also impose the restriction that       as a 
coherency condition. This gives us the reduced form model: 
(13)                   
(14)         (       )                      
Again, if    and    are found to be zero in the baseline model we can simplify 
the above to: 
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(15)                   
(16)                       
Likelihood ratio tests between each of the above specifications will help shed light on 
which of the three model specifications above is most valid given the data available. 
 
3. Data 
The data analyzed come from the National Survey of Families and Households 
(NSFH), a nationally representative longitudinal survey of 13,017 adult respondents 
interviewed in three separate waves: 1987-88, 1992-94, and 2001-2003. Unlike the 
National Crime Victimization Survey that was examined in previous work, the NSFH 
contains information on whether and when the respondent received welfare benefits. 
An additional major advantage is that the questions regarding domestic violence are 
worded in such a way as to encourage self-reporting
1
; in contrast, many studies have 
been forced to rely on incidents reported to the local police. Furthermore, the timing 
of the survey waves allows us both to determine a baseline relationship between 
domestic violence and welfare receipt before the welfare reforms and analyze how 
that relationship changed post-reform. Considerable information is also available on 
the respondent’s family background. 
Unfortunately, due to funding issues, geographic information for each 
respondent is unavailable in wave 3, so state-level variables (including potential 
welfare benefits) for the respondent’s state of residence cannot be included. To 
                                                 
1
 Unlike most data sets, this survey does not require that a violent incident be reported to local 
authorities making the potential number of incidents reported in the survey higher. The survey question 
asked “During the past year, how many fights with your partner resulted in him/her hitting, shoving, or 
throwing things at you?” This question was then reduced to an indicator variable taking on a value of 1 
if there were a positive number of incidents reported. 
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address this issue, two separate samples are created using the NSFH dataset. Sample 1 
includes data from waves 1 and 2 only and bases state-level variables on the woman’s 
current state of residence. Sample 2 includes data from all three waves, but the state-
level variables are based on the respondent’s state of birth.  
Both samples are restricted to include only women who are either married or 
cohabiting with an intimate partner at the time of the interview as domestic violence 
data are not available for other women. In addition, the primary analysis will be 
limited to households that have an income below three times the poverty line as very 
few households with higher incomes would be eligible for welfare in any event. 
Sample 2 is also restricted due to the nature of wave 3. In addition to the lack of 
geographical information, wave 3 was limited to include only respondents who had a 
“focal child” available at the time the wave 2 interview was conducted. A focal child 
is simply a child of the respondent about whom additional questions were asked at 
each interview. Because of this, Sample 2 also excludes respondents in waves 1 and 2 
who do not fit this same selection criteria. This resulted in only a minor sample 
reduction (185 observations were lost). 
Samples 1 and 2 both include information on the respondent’s demographic 
characteristics such as age and race, her education level, and her income and her 
spouse’s. In addition to these individual and couple characteristics, we are also 
interested in some state-level variables such as the average monthly welfare benefit 
per recipient and the unemployment rate. Some variables used in the analysis were 
created using the information available in the sample. A description of the 
construction of these variables follows. 
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3.1 Constructed Variables 
One of the two outcomes analyzed in the paper is domestic violence. The 
question regarding violence in the relationship reads: “During the past year, how 
many fights with your partner (husband/wife) resulted in him/her hitting, shoving, or 
throwing things at you?” A zero-one indicator variable was created that takes a value 
of one if the number of such fights was greater than zero, and zero otherwise.
2
  
The variable indicating welfare receipt was straightforward to construct in 
waves 1 and 2, but less so in wave 3. In waves 1 and 2 respondents were asked if they 
had received any income from public assistance. The only questions pertaining to 
welfare receipt in wave 3, however, read: “(In the last 12 months did you (or anyone 
in your entire household) receive. . .) public assistance, including AFDC, general 
assistance, or payment from any other state welfare program?  Include food stamps 
and energy assistance; do not include Supplemental Security Income (SSI).” and 
“Who received public assistance income? (ENTER PERSON NUMBER)”. This data 
was combined with the person number information in order to construct a zero-one 
indicator for any receipt of welfare payments by the respondent in the past 12 months.  
Wave 3 also posed some difficulty in creating the respondent’s and spouse’s 
income variables since the respondents were not asked about their spouse/partner’s 
income directly. To create the relevant income variables the “respondent’s” income 
was taken from both the main respondent data file and from the spouse data file and 
the two separate datasets were merged. A composite variable was then created for the 
respondent’s income that was equal to the main respondent’s income if the main 
respondent was female and equal to the spouse’s income if the main respondent was 
                                                 
2
 This question was asked of both married and cohabiting respondents. Two separate indicators were 
created and then summed to create one composite variable that indicates the occurrence of violent 
fights regardless of marital status. 
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male. A similar variable was created for the spouse’s income. Couple income then is 
simply the sum of the two. All income variables were adjusted to be in constant 1988 
dollars.  
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics from samples 1 and 2. We can see that 
overall domestic violence rates as well as welfare receipt rates are fairly low in both 
samples. Though sample 2 is only a slightly modified version of sample 1, it is still 
important to verify that the data from waves 1 and 2 in both samples are comparable. 
Indeed, no substantial differences exist for any of the variables, and statistically 
significant differences are only found for two of the race indicators and a few of the 
state-level variables (not surprising considering that birth state is used in Sample 2 
and state of residence is used in Sample 1). It should also be noted that over 50% of 
the respondents in waves 1 and 2 are known to be currently living in their state of 
birth. For welfare recipients and abuse victims this percentage is even higher at 70% 
and 61% respectively, which strengthens the case for using birth state as a proxy. 
However, a number of differences stand out in wave 3 of Sample 2. One such 
difference occurs in the two variables of interest. Domestic violence rates are slightly 
higher (though not significantly) and welfare receipt rates are significantly lower than 
in waves 1 and 2. Since the reforms of the 1990’s, which aimed to reduce the number 
of individuals dependent on welfare, had occurred between waves 2 and 3, this 
difference is to be expected. Another difference that stands out is in the income of the 
respondents and of their spouses/partners. It appears that in wave 3 the respondents 
have significantly more income than in previous waves, but their spouses/partners 
have significantly less income.  
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Table 1.2 investigates how domestic violence rates differ with certain key 
variables like welfare status, income levels, poverty status, race, and education level. 
We can immediately see from that while there are slight differences in domestic 
violence levels among different groups of women, most of these differences are not 
significant. In fact, domestic violence only varies significantly by welfare status and 
low income status. It appears that welfare recipients have nearly four times the 
victimization rate as women who are not on welfare, which is consistent with the 
literature. We also notice that women in low income households are also more likely 
to be victims of domestic violence, though this difference is only minor compared to 
the difference in welfare status. This seems to indicate that simply coming from a low 
income household does not make women more likely to be victims, but rather the act 
of receiving welfare benefits that makes the difference. 
 
4. Model Selection 
 Using the model selection strategy described in section 2.3, we can now use 
the NSFH data to determine which theoretical model best describes the relationship 
between welfare receipt and domestic violence. This exercise is repeated for both 
samples, though the included variables differ slightly between Sample 1 and Sample 
2.  
 Ideally the model selection process would incorporate testing the model in 
which welfare receipt and domestic violence are mutually determined. However, this 
fully nested model is not identified using standard techniques. Thus, only the models 
which are partially nested will be tested. Three different models will be estimated 
according to the model selection procedure outlined in section 2. The baseline model 
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will test whether the potential use of welfare or the underlying state of the relationship 
have any effect on each other. The traditional model will test the relationship that has 
been presented in the literature: that welfare receipt affects domestic violence rates. 
Finally, the non-traditional model will test the reverse relationship: that domestic 
violence affects whether a woman will receive welfare. Because each of these 
relationships are theoretically valid, this model selection procedure will give us a 
better idea of which relationships can be seen in the data as well as allow us to test 
which model best fits the data.  
A bivariate probit model is used initially in the model selection procedure to 
test whether there is any correlation between the error terms of the two equations. If 
we cannot reject that the correlation is zero then two separate probit models may be 
run.  
 In order to identify both equations in the system, a set of excluded exogenous 
variables is needed in each equation. In the domestic violence equation, state-level 
variables indicating whether unilateral divorce is allowed as well as the ratio of single 
men to single women are included. These variables should only affect the welfare 
decision indirectly through how they affect the level of violence and the woman’s 
outside option. Stevenson and Wolfers (2006), for example, found that the presence of 
unilateral divorce laws significantly decreased domestic violence rates, making it a 
promising candidate for an excluded exogenous variable. The relative supply and 
demand of single men to women should also affect domestic violence rates because it 
measures one of the woman’s outside options. Women who have better options 
outside of the relationship should be less willing to tolerate abuse. The higher this 
ratio is then, the greater the likelihood the woman can find another partner if she 
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should leave her current relationship. Thus, we expect the effect of this ratio on 
domestic violence rates to be negative. 
 Also included in the domestic violence equation is a set of dummy variables 
indicating the religion observed by the household. Here, atheism is treated as the 
excluded group. A small literature has examined the relationship between religion and 
domestic violence and it is typically found that regular attendance of religious 
gatherings has an inverse relationship with domestic violence rates. Ellison and 
Anderson (2002), for example, use the NSFH to analyze this relationship and find that 
even after controlling for various individual and social factors that may affect 
violence, regular attendance negatively affects violence rates. 
The welfare equation includes state-level data on the average monthly welfare 
benefit and the percentage of residents in the state that receive welfare payments each 
month and also includes individual data on whether the respondent’s family received 
welfare payments and if her mother worked while she was growing up. The 
respondent’s economic conditions while growing up are likely to be the most reliable 
excluded exogenous variables in this dataset. This is perhaps because individuals who 
had exposure to the welfare system while growing up have greater access to 
knowledge about the welfare system, how to apply, and what benefits they could 
qualify for. There are numerous studies linking family conditions growing up to 
welfare usage as an adult. Vartanian (1999), for example, finds that the more years an 
individual’s family was receiving welfare as a child the more likely he/she is to go on 
welfare as an adult, but that this result is only significant for African Americans.  
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4.1 Baseline Model  
The first model run assumes that        , or that actual welfare receipt 
and actual domestic violence do not matter in the system. In this model the multiple 
estimates of    and    are tested for equality and significance
3
. The results of the 
baseline model can be found in Table 1.3.  
It immediately stands out that we cannot reject that         (although it 
may be that the individual estimates of    and    are poor). In fact, none of the 
individual estimates of    and    were significantly different from zero. This 
indicates that the temptation to use welfare services has no influence on whether a 
relationship is abusive, and that the potential for abuse has no influence on whether a 
woman chooses to go on welfare.  
There is, however, an indirect relationship that emerges between the two 
variables of interest and that is through the correlation of their error terms. There is a 
positive and significant correlation of 0.33 to 0.37 in both samples. This indicates that 
not only is the bivariate probit model more appropriate, but that unobservable factors 
that affect domestic violence rates also have an impact on whether a woman receives 
welfare and vice versa.  
Also of note is the fact that both equations in Sample 1 have significant 
excluded exogenous variables and for the most part these excluded exogenous 
variables seem to be significant in only their respective equations.  
4.2 Traditional Model 
In the next model the assumption that either          is relaxed by 
allowing welfare receipt to affect domestic violence. Note that this model is similar to 
                                                 
3
 Because    and    are both overidentified we will have multiple estimates for them, thus also 
necessitating the test of equality. 
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the model that has been commonly assumed in the literature and that the baseline 
model is nested in this model, thus we can test between both specifications. The 
results of this model specification can be found in Table 1.4. 
 Welfare appears to have no impact on domestic violence rates in Sample 1. In 
fact, hardly any explanatory variables seem to have an impact on domestic violence. 
Sample 2, however, finds that welfare does have some effect on domestic violence 
rates in the years after the reforms took place, however, there is still no effect in the 
years prior to the reforms.  
As in the baseline model, both equations have significant excluded exogenous 
variables, which indicates that this model is indeed identified. We can also reject the 
baseline model relative to the traditional model through a likelihood ratio test.  
4.3 Non-Traditional Model 
 The final model tested reverses the direction of the relationship between 
domestic violence and welfare receipt and proposes that domestic violence affects a 
woman’s decision of whether to receive welfare. As with the traditional model, the 
baseline model is nested in this non-traditional model so we may test between the 
two. The results of this model specification can be found in Table 1.5 (for Sample 1) 
and Table 1.6 (for Sample 2).  
 We can see that domestic violence has a significant negative impact on 
welfare take-up in the years prior to the reforms in both samples. We can also see in 
Table 1.6 that this negative impact of domestic violence was magnified in the years 
after the reforms.  
 The baseline model can also be rejected relative to the non-traditional model 
through a likelihood ratio test. Finally, due to the higher log likelihoods in both 
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samples and the significance of the variables of interest in all waves we can reject the 
traditional model relative to the non-traditional model. This exercise thus implies that 
the preferred model is: 
(17)                   
(18)                       
where   and   are distributed joint normally.  
Note that the direction of causality is opposite to what has been presumed in 
the literature and that, of the three models estimated, the presumed model is not the 
most preferred model which makes this finding all the more interesting.  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Pre-Reform Analysis 
 Table 1.5 presents the full set of estimates from the preferred model. Standard 
errors are clustered on the respondents’ states of residence.  
 Estimates from the period before the welfare reforms took effect indicate that 
domestic violence exerted a substantial negative influence on a woman’s decision to 
receive welfare benefits even after taking income, schooling and other variables into 
account. Going from a non-abusive relationship to an abusive one decreased the 
likelihood that a woman went on welfare by a factor of 2.2, ceteris paribus, implying 
the average woman in a non-abusive relationship would go from just over a 6 percent 
chance of going on welfare to only a 3 percent chance if her current relationship were 
to become abusive.  
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 This result suggests a somewhat troubling potential implication of the 
PRWORA. If welfare is thought to be one means for women from low income 
households to gain additional resources needed to flee an abusive relationship and the 
reforms made it more difficult to receive aid, there could be negative impacts on 
women who were victims of abuse. Since we have found that women who are in 
abusive relationships are less likely to use welfare services, the new limits could cause 
these women to stay in abusive relationships longer because welfare has become a 
less viable option. While there have been efforts to address this issue through 
initiatives such as the Family Violence Option, it is by no means certain that a woman 
would identify herself as being abused or that her state has this type of program.  
 Many other factors are also important in determining whether a woman 
receives welfare. All of the results in Table 1.5 have the expected signs, e.g., welfare 
receipt is less likely for higher income households and for more educated individuals, 
but more likely for larger households. One result that may not seem sensible is that 
higher unemployment rates significantly decrease the likelihood that a woman will 
receive welfare, although this might be explained if the household’s income at that 
time is a poor reflection of its permanent income. 
 Interestingly enough, the only significant factors determining domestic 
violence in this model are a person’s age, cohabitation status, and several of the 
religion dummies. Older women are found to be less likely to be victims of abuse. 
This is confirmed in previous studies which have hypothesized that older individuals 
typically have had more time to accrue resources and are therefore less likely to 
tolerate abuse. Older women also typically have had more time to search for a suitable 
partner who is not abusive. We also see that women in cohabiting relationships are 
more likely to be victims of abuse than married women. Stets and Straus (1990) found 
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similar results using data from the National Family Violence Survey. For the most 
part it also appears that having some religious affiliation reduces the risk of violence 
as well, a finding that is consistent with those of Ellison and Anderson (2002).  
 Also note that the value of rho is 0.860, a very strong positive correlation 
between the error terms of the two equations. The test that rho is equal to zero is 
rejected and therefore we can conclude that there is in fact some endogeneity that 
needs to be accounted for in estimation. Thus the bivariate probit model is more 
appropriate than individual probit models.  
 Finally, because of the correlation between the error terms of both equations 
and because domestic violence appears in the welfare equation, it is necessary to 
satisfy the condition that the excluded exogenous variables in the domestic violence 
equation be jointly significant. A X
2
 test of the hypothesis that the coefficients are 
jointly equal to zero is run on the variables: unilateral divorce, single sex ratio, and 
religion. The results of the test indicate that at 99 percent confidence we can reject the 
hypothesis and that the model is indeed identified. 
5.2 Post-Reform Analysis 
 A similar bivariate probit model is run for Sample 2, which includes the wave 
of data that occurred after the welfare reforms took place, to see if our predictions of 
the effects of the reforms are supported. Additional indicators include whether the 
data come from wave 3, whether a woman’s state of birth has adopted the FVO, and 
each possible interaction between domestic violence, wave 3 and FVO status. The 
results of this estimation can be found in Table 1.6. 
 Domestic violence is still found to exert a significantly large negative 
influence on a woman’s choice to go on welfare, and the effect appears to be 
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magnified in the post-reform years. This is consistent with what was predicted: the 
reforms made it less likely that anyone would receive welfare, including abused 
women. Also of note is the result that women who reported abuse were more likely to 
go on welfare if their state of birth had adopted the FVO than women who were not 
victims in that state, suggesting that the FVO at least partially achieved the goal of 
making welfare more accessible to victims of abuse.  
To gain a better understanding of the magnitudes of these changes we can 
compare the predicted probability of receiving welfare under different combinations 
of pre and post reform eras, victim status, and FVO status. Table 1.7 presents the 
predicted probability that a woman will receive welfare given these different 
combinations of characteristics.  
There are several notable estimates. First, women who were victims of abuse 
were seven times more likely to go on welfare, pre-reform, in states that would 
ultimately end up adopting the FVO than victims in non-FVO states. We also observe 
that while there was a dramatic reduction in the probability of receiving welfare for 
women in FVO states after the reforms took place, the likelihood of going on welfare 
for women in non-FVO states after the reforms was reduced to essentially zero. Both 
of these observations suggest that the FVO initiative did at least help alleviate some of 
the negative impacts of the reforms on victims.  
We can also see that victims of abuse in the post-reform era were more likely 
to receive welfare if their birth state had adopted the FVO. While this effect only 
brings the likelihood of welfare receipt up to 0.1 percent it is a large effect compared 
with the likelihood in non-FVO states.  
Unfortunately it appears that the overall effect of domestic violence on welfare 
receipt is negative. Despite the efforts of the FVO to increase access to aid to 
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victimized women these women are still less likely to use the welfare system than 
women in safer relationships which suggests that other initiatives may be required to 
help increase access. Not all states have provisions allowing exemptions from TANF 
requirements for victims of abuse, so making these provisions a requirement for all 
states may help improve conditions for victims. Additional programs aimed at helping 
victimized women become self-sufficient such as education, job-training programs, or 
welfare-to-work programs specifically targeted at women may also improve 
conditions for abused women.  
 Both equations also have excluded exogenous variables that are significant. 
The state-level variable measuring the percentage of the state’s population that 
receives welfare assistance per month is found to significantly positively increase the 
likelihood of welfare receipt which is consistent with what is expected. Religion again 
plays a significant role in determining the likelihood of domestic violence with any 
kind of religious affiliation diminishing the likelihood of violence. A state having 
unilateral divorce also significantly reduces the likelihood of domestic violence which 
is consistent with the earlier findings of Stevenson and Wolfers (2006). The 
hypothesis that the excluded exogenous variables are jointly insignificant is rejected 
for the domestic violence equation at 99 percent, again indicating that the model is 
identified.  
  
6. Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
 The results found in this study are worrying given the nature of the 1996 
reforms since they made it more difficult to receive benefits and limited the amount of 
time one could collect them. If women are unable to use the welfare system as a 
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means to escape violent relationships because the system’s requirements are too strict 
given their conditions, and if the welfare system is now cutting back on the number of 
people who can receive benefits there may be an adverse impact on the rates of 
domestic abuse. Policy makers have attempted to address this issue by constructing an 
optional Family Violence Option that states can adopt individually which would help 
women who identified themselves as being victims by waiving some of the limitations 
of the new policy, but in light of the results of this study it seems that the reforms still 
had a substantial negative impact on women who were in violent relationships.   
 This study did establish that states that ultimately would adopt the FVO had 
higher rates of victimized women in the system than states that did not adopt the FVO 
even in the pre-reform era. One extension of this work might be to carefully analyze 
the pre-reform characteristics of the welfare system in the states that eventually 
adopted the FVO to see if there are any major differences between them and non-FVO 
states that make them more accessible to victimized women. Further, states had 
considerable freedom in how they chose to implement the FVO and could choose 
which welfare requirements they wanted to waive for victims as well as if they 
wanted to offer additional services to victims such as referral to battered women’s 
shelters. Analysis of these differences and how they affect welfare receipt for victims 
may offer even greater insight as to what can be done to improve the system. 
 Another extension to this research might focus on how the labor force 
participation of women and domestic violence are related. This study could 
encompass a wider variety of women since the decision of whether or not to work 
must be made at all income levels, but the choice to go on welfare or not is only 
relevant for those with low enough incomes. Such a study could also provide some 
insight into how the use of domestic violence differs by income levels. It could 
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answer questions such as whether men with lower incomes were more or less likely to 
be threatened by a woman working and contributing a significant amount to a 
household’s pool of resources.  
  
30 
 
 
References 
Aizer, A. (2010). The Gender Wage Gap and Domestic Violence. American 
 Economic Review. Volume 100, Issue 4. pp. 1847-1859.  
 
Anderberg, D., & Rainer, H. (2011). Domestic Abuse: Instrumental Violence and 
 Economics Incentives. CESifo Working Paper Series. Number 3673. 
 
Bloch, F., & Rao, V. (2002). Terror as a Bargaining Instrument: A Case Study of 
 Dowry Violence in Rural India. American Economic Review. Volume 92, 
 Issue 4. pp. 1029-1043. 
 
Ellison, C. G., & Anderson, K. L. (2002). Religious Involvement and Domestic 
 Violence Among U.S. Couples. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. 
 Volume 40, Issue 2. pp. 269-286. 
 
Farmer, A., & Tiefenthaler, J. (1997). An Economic Analysis of Domestic Violence. 
 Review of Social Economy. Volume 55. pp. 337-358. 
 
Farmer, A., & Tiefenthaler, J. (2003). Explaining the Recent Decline in Domestic 
 Violence. Contemporary Economics Policy. Volume 21, Issue 2. pp. 158-172. 
 
Heckman, J. J. (1978). Dummy Endogenous Variables in a Simultaneous Equation 
 System. Econometrica. Volume 46, Number 4. pp. 931-959. 
 
Hetling, A. H. (2000). Addressing Domestic Violence as a Barrier to Self-Sufficiency: 
 The Relationship of Welfare Receipt and Spousal Abuse.  Journal of Public 
 and International Affairs. Volume 11. pp. 21-35.  
 
Kurz, D. (1989). Social science perspectives on wife abuse: Current debates and 
 future directions. Gender & Society. Volume 3. pp. 489–505. 
 
Legal Momentum (2004). Family Violence Option: State by State Summary. 
 www.legalmomentum.org. 
 
Lidman, R. M. (1995). The Family Income Study and Washington’s Welfare 
 Population: A Comprehensive Review. Washington State Institute for Public 
 Policy.  
 
31 
 
 
Lloyd, S. (1997). The Effects of Violence on Women’s Employment. Law and Policy. 
 Volume 19, Number 2. pp. 139-167. 
 
Nou, J., & Timmins, C. (2005). How Do Changes in Welfare Law Afffect  Domestic 
 Violence? An Analysis of Connecticut Towns 1990-2000. The Journal of 
 Legal Studies. Volume 32, Number 2. pp. 445-469. 
 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
  No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). Print. 
 
Raphael, J., & Tolman, R. (1997). Trapped by poverty, trapped by abuse: New 
 evidence documenting the relationship between domestic violence and welfare 
 reform. Report of the Project for Research on Welfare, Work, and Domestic 
 Violence. Chicago and Ann Arbor: The Taylor Institute and the University of 
 Michigan Research Development Center on Poverty, Risk and Mental Health.  
 
Stets, J. E., & Straus, M. A. (1989). The marriage license as hitting license: A 
 comparison of assaults in dating, cohabiting, and married couples.” In  
 M. A.Straus & R. J.Gelles (Eds.), Physical violence in American families: risk 
 factors and adaptations to violence in 8,145 families (pp. 227–244). New 
 Brunswick , NJ : Transaction. 
 
Stevenson, B., & Wolfers, J. (2006). “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce 
 Laws and Family Distress. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. Volume 121, 
 Number 1.  
 
Tauchen, H. V., Witte, A. D., & Long, S. K. (1991). Domestic Violence: A 
 Nonrandom Affair. International Economic Review. Volume 32, Number 2. 
 pp. 491-511.  
 
The Better Homes Fund. The Worcester Family Research Project. Unpublished 
 report. Newton Center: The Better Homes Fund, Massachusetts.  
 
Vartanian, T. P. (1999). Childhood Conditions and Adult Welfare Use: Examining 
 Neighborhood and Family Factors. Journal of Marriage and Family. Volume 
 61, Number 1.  
 
  
32 
 
 
Tables 
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics Samples 1 and 2 
Variable Average Value 
(Sample 1) 
Average Value 
(Sample 2: Waves 1 and 2) 
Average Value 
(Sample 2: Wave 3) 
Domestic Violence 0.056 
(0.005) 
0.057 
(0.005) 
0.070 
(0.009) 
Welfare  0.066 
(0.005) 
0.066 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.003) 
Age 39.011 
(0.267) 
38.878 
(0.281) 
53.869 
(0.231) 
Number of Children 2.530 
(0.043) 
2.509 
(0.045) 
2.057 
(0.011) 
Schooling 11.969 
(0.053) 
12.091 
(0.052) 
10.384 
(0.219) 
White 0.747 
(0.009) 
0.770 
(0.009) 
0.744 
(0.016) 
Black 0.163 
(0.008) 
0.167 
(0.008) 
0.178 
(0.014) 
Hispanic 0.089 
(0.006) 
0.063 
(0.005) 
0.078 
(0.010) 
Respondent’s Income    5395.696 
(157.045) 
5360.756 
(163.118) 
8681.322 
(489.187) 
Spouse/Partner’s Income 14049.090 
(260.707) 
14205.580 
(273.192) 
8495.406 
(491.378) 
Welfare Growing Up 0.143 
(0.007) 
0.146 
(0.008) 
0.127 
(0.012) 
Mother Worked 0.535 
(0.011) 
0.544 
(0.011) 
0.499 
(0.018) 
Cohabiting 0.047 
(0.005) 
0.048 
(0.005) 
0.053 
(0.008) 
Unilateral Divorce 0.568 
(0.011) 
0.537 
(0.011) 
0.533 
(0.018) 
Unemployment Rate 3.301 
(0.056) 
5.846 
(0.033) 
5.541 
(0.029) 
Single Sex Ratio 1.094 
(0.001) 
1.093 
(0.001) 
1.077 
(0.002) 
% Monthly Welfare Recipients 4.492 
(0.034) 
4.633 
(0.034) 
1.806 
(0.032) 
Avg. Monthly Welfare Payment 1368.726 
(11.236) 
1364.482 
(11.703) 
1473.531 
(22.908) 
SMSA status 0.702 
(0.010) 
N/A N/A 
Northeast 0.146 
(0.008) 
N/A N/A 
Northcentral 0.299 
(0.010) 
N/A N/A 
South 0.385 
(0.035) 
N/A N/A 
West 0.171 
(0.008) 
N/A N/A 
Spouse Present at Interview 0.352 
(0.010) 
N/A N/A 
Number of Observations 2194 2018 758 
Notes:  
Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
Monetary values in constant 1988 dollars. 
Sample restricted to households with a total income below three times the poverty line. 
*, **, and *** indicate significant differences at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels respectively. 
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Table 1.2: Domestic Violence Rates Across Groups (Sample 1) 
Variable N Mean Difference 
White 1640 0.057 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
Non-White 554 0.054 
(0.010) 
 
Black 358 0.059 
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.014) 
Non-Black 1836 0.056 
(0.005) 
 
Hispanic 196 0.046 
(0.015) 
-0.011 
(0.016) 
Non-Hispanic 1998 0.057 
(0.005) 
 
On Welfare 144 0.181 
(0.032) 
0.133*** 
(0.033) 
Not on Welfare 2050 0.047 
(0.005) 
 
In Poverty 669 0.060 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
Not in Poverty 1525 0.054 
(0.006) 
 
No HS Diploma 482 0.058 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.012) 
HS or Higher 1712 0.055 
(0.006) 
 
Notes:  
Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
Sample restricted to households with a total income below three times the poverty 
line. 
*, **, and *** indicate significant differences at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence 
levels. 
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Table 1.3: Model Selection Results (Baseline Model) 
 Sample 1: Pre-Reform Sample 2: All Waves 
Variable Coefficient  
(Welfare Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(D.V. Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(Welfare Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(D.V. Eq.) 
D* (X2 test: estimates jointly = 0) 
 
W* (X2 test: estimates jointly = 0) 
 
(0.992) 
 
 
 
 
(0.529) 
(0.891) 
 
 
 
 
(0.886) 
Wave 3   -0.164 
(0.315) 
0.599** 
(0.275) 
     Wave 3 x FVO   -0.885** 
(0.414) 
0.061 
(0.257) 
FVO   0.082 
(0.120) 
0.191 
(0.123) 
Household Size 0.082*** 
(0.035) 
0.010 
(0.028) 
0.085*** 
(0.026) 
0.001 
(0.025) 
Number of Children -0.011 
(0.024) 
-0.010 
(0.723) 
3.71x10-4 
(0.024) 
-0.009 
(0.027) 
Age -0.041*** 
(0.005) 
-0.036*** 
(0.006) 
-0.041*** 
(0.006) 
-0.030*** 
(0.005) 
Schooling -0.075*** 
(0.020) 
-0.006 
(0.020) 
-0.069*** 
(0.021) 
-0.023*** 
(0.009) 
Log of Resp. Income -0.046*** 
(0.011) 
0.021* 
(0.013) 
-0.032*** 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
Log of Couple Income -0.085*** 
(0.014) 
-0.025 
(0.018) 
-0.094*** 
(0.014) 
-0.029** 
(0.013) 
Black 0.343** 
(0.101) 
0.023 
(0.117) 
0.345*** 
(0.132) 
0.032 
(0.099) 
Hispanic -0.308 
(0.196) 
-0.122 
(0.166) 
-0.196 
(0.168) 
0.021 
(0.178) 
SMSA 0.092 
(0.105) 
-0.063 
(0.105) 
  
 
Northeast -0.312* 
(0.183) 
0.081 
(0.170) 
-0.040 
(0.177) 
-0.022 
(0.135) 
South -0.084 
(0.107) 
-0.093 
(0.101) 
-0.185 
(0.119) 
-0.225* 
(0.122) 
West -0.225* 
(0.133) 
0.170 
(0.136) 
-0.384** 
(0.193) 
-0.276 
(0.172) 
Unemployment Rate -0.040** 
(0.017) 
-0.019 
(0.019) 
-0.093** 
(0.040) 
-0.012 
(0.036) 
Excluded Exogenous Variables 
Welfare: 
     Welfare Growing Up 
 
0.231* 
(0.123) 
 
0.218** 
(0.110) 
 
0.163 
(0.114) 
 
-0.033 
(0.104) 
     Mother Worked -0.102 
(0.089) 
-0.074 
(0.089) 
-0.036 
(0.094) 
0.076 
(0.083) 
     % Mo. Welfare Recipients -0.024 
(0.034) 
0.011 
(0.040) 
0.065 
(0.043) 
0.033 
(0.037) 
     Average Mo. Benefit 2.31x10-5 
(8.92x10-5) 
1.57x10-5 
(1.15x10-4) 
-2.72x10-4 
(1.91x10-4) 
-7.67x10-5 
(9.49x10-5) 
Domestic Violence: 
     Unilateral Divorce 
 
-0.048 
(0.081) 
 
0.010 
(0.101) 
 
0.016 
(0.094) 
 
-0.137 
(0.092) 
     Single Sex Ratio 0.611 
(0.485) 
-0.034 
(0.803) 
1.073 
(0.658) 
0.351 
(0.783) 
     Religion Dummies 
 
* *** *** *** 
Number of Observations 
Log pseudolikelihood 
Wald test of Rho=0: 
N = 2194 
L = -823.514 
Rho = 0.365 
 
 
p-value = 0.000 
N = 2776 
L = -976.727 
Rho = 0.332 
 
 
p-value = 0.000 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors clustered on percentage monthly welfare recipients in parentheses. 
All marginal effects are partial elasticities of the form dlogPr(y=1)/dx and are the sum of the direct and indirect effects when applicable.  
Samples restricted to households with a total income below three times the poverty line. 
Individual dummies indicating religious denomination were also included in the domestic violence equation. The significance test is a test of 
all dummies being jointly equal to 0.  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels. 
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Table 1.4: Model Selection Results (Traditional Model) 
 Sample 1: Pre-Reform Sample 2: All Waves 
Variable Coefficient 
(Welfare Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(D.V. Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(Welfare Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(D.V. Eq.) 
Welfare  0.873 
(1.620) 
 0.270 
(0.982) 
     Welfare x Wave 3    -4.592*** 
(0.756) 
     Welfare x FVO    0.847* 
(0.498) 
     Welfare x Wave 3 x FVO    4.797*** 
(0.882) 
Wave 3   -0.166 
(0.318) 
0.468* 
(0.253) 
     Wave 3 x FVO   -0.792** 
(0.385) 
0.152 
(0.267) 
FVO   0.042 
(0.116) 
0.085 
(0.132) 
Household Size 0.073** 
(0.036) 
-0.006 
(0.032) 
0.073*** 
(0.025) 
-0.013 
(0.027) 
Number of Children -0.010 
(0.025) 
-0.004 
(0.029) 
0.006 
(0.021) 
-0.016 
(0.028) 
Age -0.041*** 
(0.004) 
-0.032*** 
(0.010) 
-0.040*** 
(0.006) 
-0.025*** 
(0.005) 
Schooling -0.082*** 
(0.020) 
0.003 
(0.030) 
-0.074*** 
(0.021) 
-0.019** 
(0.009) 
Log of Resp. Income -0.040*** 
(0.011) 
0.027* 
(0.015) 
-0.027** 
(0.012) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
Log of Couple Income -0.082*** 
(0.014) 
-0.009 
(0.036) 
-0.085*** 
(0.014) 
-0.019 
(0.014) 
Black 0.326** 
(0.098) 
-0.019 
(0.139) 
0.322*** 
(0.124) 
-0.008 
(0.108) 
Hispanic -0.336* 
(0.201) 
-0.065 
(0.174) 
-0.175 
(0.174) 
0.061 
(0.181) 
SMSA 0.063 
(0.102) 
-0.077 
(0.106) 
 
 
 
 
Northeast -0.278 
(0.199) 
0.128 
(0.172) 
0.002 
(0.167) 
-0.037 
(0.129) 
South -0.113 
(0.108) 
-0.086 
(0.107) 
-0.153 
(0.115) 
-0.207* 
(0.108) 
West -0.245* 
(0.149) 
0.203 
(0.143) 
-0.250 
(0.193) 
-0.254 
(0.166) 
Unemployment Rate -0.042** 
(0.019) 
-0.015 
(0.020) 
-0.113*** 
(0.042) 
0.008 
(0.032) 
Excluded Exogenous Variables 
Welfare: 
     Welfare Growing Up 
 
0.244* 
(0.127) 
  
0.163 
(0.107) 
 
     Mother Worked -0.085 
(0.087) 
 -0.049 
(0.097) 
 
     % Mo. Welfare Recipients -0.038 
(0.030) 
 0.077* 
(0.041) 
 
     Average Mo. Benefit 2.38x10-5 
(9.66x10-5) 
 -2.803x10-4 
(1.762x10-4) 
 
Domestic Violence: 
     Unilateral Divorce 
  
0.016 
(0.103) 
  
-0.140 
(0.088) 
     Single Sex Ratio  -0.267 
(0.746) 
 0.184 
(0.738) 
     Religion Dummies  ***  *** 
     
Number of Observations 
Log pseudolikelihood 
Wald test of Rho=0: 
N = 2194 
L = -841.926 
Rho = -0.086 
 
 
p-value = 0.916 
N = 2776 
L = -991.934 
Rho = -0.192 
 
 
p-value = 0.630 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors clustered on percentage monthly welfare recipients in parentheses. 
All marginal effects are partial elasticities of the form dlogPr(y=1)/dx and are the sum of the direct and indirect effects when applicable.  
Samples restricted to households with a total income below three times the poverty line. 
Individual dummies indicating religious denomination were also included in the domestic violence equation. The significance test is a test 
of all dummies being jointly equal to 0.  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels. 
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Table 1.5: Results of Preferred Model Sample 1 (waves 1 and 2—pre-reform) 
Variable Coefficient 
(Welfare Eq.) 
Marginal Effect 
(Welfare Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(D.V. Eq.) 
Marginal Effect 
(D.V. Eq.) 
Domestic Violence -1.127*** 
(0.088) 
-2.191*** 
(0.175) 
  
Household Size 0.057** 
(0.025) 
0.111** 
(0.050) 
0.005 
(0.031) 
0.011 
(0.072) 
Number of Children -0.001 
(0.022) 
-0.003 
(0.042) 
0.015 
(0.032) 
0.034 
(0.074) 
Age -0.040*** 
(0.004) 
-0.078*** 
(0.008) 
-0.033*** 
(0.005) 
-0.077*** 
(0.011) 
Schooling -0.056*** 
(0.016) 
-0.110*** 
(0.031) 
-0.021 
(0.022) 
-0.049 
(0.051) 
Log of Resp. Income -0.013 
(0.010) 
-0.026 
(0.019) 
0.015 
(0.013) 
0.035 
(0.029) 
Log of Couple Income -0.069*** 
(0.014) 
-0.134*** 
(0.028) 
-0.006 
(0.017) 
-0.013 
(0.039) 
Black 0.189** 
(0.076) 
0.368** 
(0.148) 
0.037 
(0.112) 
0.086 
(0.259) 
Hispanic -0.231 
(0.161) 
-0.450 
(0.313) 
-0.231 
(0.163) 
-0.533 
(0.379) 
SMSA 0.002 
(0.085) 
0.004 
(0.165) 
-0.039 
(0.125) 
-0.091 
(0.288) 
Northeast -0.173 
(0.146) 
-0.336 
(0.285) 
-0.010 
(0.150) 
-0.024 
(0.346) 
South -0.100 
(0.089) 
-0.195 
(0.173) 
-0.075 
(0.095) 
-0.173 
(0.220) 
West -0.058 
(0.120) 
-0.112 
(0.233) 
0.203 
(0.127) 
0.467 
(0.295) 
Unemployment Rate -0.050*** 
(0.013) 
-0.096*** 
(0.025) 
-0.022 
(0.015) 
-0.050 
(0.035) 
Excluded Exogenous Variables 
Welfare Growing Up 0.096 
(0.070) 
0.187 
(0.138) 
  
Mother Worked -0.037 
(0.048) 
-0.072 
(0.093) 
  
% Mo. Welfare Recipients -0.014 
(0.025) 
-0.027 
(0.048) 
  
Average Mo. Benefit 2.29x10-5 
(4.75x10-5) 
4.45x10-5 
(9.22x10-5) 
  
Unilateral Divorce   0.003 
(0.083) 
0.007 
(0.191) 
Single Sex Ratio   0.424 
(0.537) 
0.978 
(1.236) 
Religion Dummies 
 
  *** *** 
Number of Observations 
Log pseudolikelihood 
Wald test of Rho=0: 
N = 2194 
L = -846.864 
Rho = 0.860 
 
 
p-value = 0.008 
  
Notes: 
Robust standard errors clustered on percentage monthly welfare recipients in parentheses. 
All marginal effects are partial elasticities of the form dlogPr(y=1)/dx and are the sum of the direct and indirect effects when applicable.  
Samples restricted to households with a total income below three times the poverty line. 
Individual dummies indicating religious denomination were also included in the domestic violence equation. The significance test is a test of 
all dummies being jointly equal to 0.  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels. 
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Table 1.6: Results of Preferred Model Sample 2 (Waves 1, 2, and 3) 
Variable Coefficient 
(Welfare Eq.) 
Marginal Effect 
(Welfare Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(D.V. Eq.) 
Marginal Effect 
(D.V. Eq.) 
Domestic Violence -1.345** 
(0.623) 
-3.215** 
(1.393) 
  
     D.V. x Wave 3 -4.746*** 
(0.597) 
   
     D.V. x FVO 1.122** 
(0.437) 
   
     D.V. x Wave 3 x FVO 3.924*** 
(0.663) 
   
Wave 3 -0.117 
(0.283) 
-2.168** 
(0.947) 
0.270 
(0.144) 
0.871*** 
(0.260) 
     Wave 3 x FVO -0.699* 
(0.395) 
 0.112 
(0.279) 
 
FVO -0.054 
(0.116) 
-0.093 
(0.375) 
0.144 
(0.152) 
0.438 
(0.329) 
Household Size 0.077*** 
(0.024) 
0.190*** 
(0.062) 
-0.001 
(0.028) 
-0.003 
(0.069) 
Number of Children 0.013 
(0.021) 
0.033 
(0.051) 
0.016 
(0.028) 
0.039 
(0.070) 
Age -0.036*** 
(0.005) 
-0.089*** 
(0.016) 
-0.022*** 
(0.005) 
-0.054*** 
(0.013) 
Schooling -0.071*** 
(0.020) 
-0.175*** 
(0.054) 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
-0.034 
(0.021) 
Log of Resp. Income -0.028** 
(0.012) 
-0.069** 
(0.031) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.022 
(0.028) 
Log of Couple Income -0.080*** 
(0.013) 
-0.197*** 
(0.038) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
-0.041 
(0.032) 
Black 0.273** 
(0.128) 
0.675** 
(0.326) 
-0.071 
(0.112) 
-0.175 
(0.277) 
Hispanic -0.146 
(0.176) 
-0.360 
(0.440) 
0.082 
(0.179) 
0.204 
(0.444) 
Northeast -0.033 
(0.165) 
-0.081 
(0.409) 
-0.031 
(0.140) 
-0.076 
(0.346) 
South -0.164 
(0.116) 
-0.404 
(0.288) 
-0.226* 
(0.121) 
-0.558* 
(0.302) 
West -0.329* 
(0.194) 
-0.812* 
(0.476) 
-0.261 
(0.175) 
-0.645 
(0.435) 
Unemployment Rate -0.093** 
(0.041) 
-0.229** 
(0.107) 
0.013 
(0.034) 
0.031 
(0.084) 
Excluded Exogenous Variables 
Welfare Growing Up 0.144 
(0.100) 
0.356 
(0.247) 
  
Mother Worked -0.052 
(0.093) 
-0.129 
(0.230) 
  
% Mo. Welfare Recipients 0.077* 
(0.039) 
0.190* 
(0.102) 
  
Average Mo. Benefit -2.441x10-4 
(1.637x10-4) 
-0.001 
(0.0004) 
  
Unilateral Divorce   -0.163* 
(0.097) 
-0.404* 
(0.242) 
Single Sex Ratio   -0.507 
(0.882) 
-1.255 
(2.172) 
Religion Dummies 
 
  *** *** 
Number of Observations 
Log pseudolikelihood 
Wald test of Rho=0: 
N=2776 
L = -996.106 
Rho = 0.509                    
 
 
p-value = 0.001 
 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors clustered on percentage monthly welfare recipients in parentheses. 
All marginal effects are partial elasticities of the form dlogPr(y=1)/dx and are the sum of the direct and indirect effects when applicable.  
Samples restricted to households with a total income below three times the poverty line. 
Individual dummies indicating religious denomination were also included in the domestic violence equation. The significance test is a test 
of all dummies being jointly equal to 0.  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels. 
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Table 1.7: Variations in Likelihood of Welfare Receipt 
Wave 3 x Domestic Violence x FVO Pr(W=1 | 3, D, F) Standard Error 
0, 0, 0 0.070 0.015 
0, 0, 1 0.064 0.012 
0, 1, 0 0.005 0.006 
0, 1, 1 0.044 0.035 
1, 0, 0 0.058 0.025 
1, 0, 1 0.015 0.011 
1, 1, 0 5.09x10
-11
 9.55x10
-11
 
1, 1, 1 0.001 0.002 
Notes: 
Predicted probabilities are calculated by holding all personal and state-level 
characteristics constant, but treating every observation as being in wave 3, a 
victim, and/or in an FVO state.  
 
  
39 
 
 
Chapter 2: “Women’s Employment and Domestic Violence: An Analysis by 
Income Levels” 
 
Introduction 
  Women stay in abusive relationships or return to them for various reasons. 
Among these reasons is a lack of financial independence. It is logical then to suppose 
that gaining employment or furthering her education could potentially give a woman 
enough resources to leave the relationship if she chooses or at least increase her 
bargaining power enough to deter abuse. This, however, is not always the case.  
 Considerable evidence has shown that a woman’s employment may actually 
provoke abuse. A study conducted by Allard et al in 1996 showed that victims of 
abuse are fifteen times more likely to have partners that disapproved of their attempts 
to work or further their education and actively tried to prevent it. Intervention could 
be non-violent in the form of turning off alarms before work, destroying class notes 
etc., but could also take a more violent form via abuse before important job interviews 
and other similar methods. This evidence suggests that programs aimed at increasing 
educational attainment and improving employment opportunities for women may 
actually have an unintended negative effect on women who are victims of abuse. 
 Thus far the literature has been divided as to the direction of the relationship. 
Does employment provoke a reaction in terms of domestic violence, or does domestic 
violence influence a woman’s decision to work. There has, however, been a 
consensus that the relationship does depend on several factors, primarily the relative 
bargaining powers of the man and woman. While many different methods of 
measuring this bargaining power have been used, the primary idea is that if a woman 
has a relatively high amount of bargaining power to begin with, employment may 
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raise her threat point enough that we see a negative relationship between abuse and 
employment emerge. Conversely, for women with relatively low bargaining power, 
employment may not raise her threat point enough and a positive relationship between 
abuse and employment may emerge. 
 This paper uses a similar theoretical framework to that in the literature and 
suggests that the relationship is likely different for women with spouses of different 
income levels. Further, several theoretical relationships between domestic violence 
and employment are tested to see if the relationship is more complex than the 
literature has assumed. Ultimately it is found that working has a positive effect on 
domestic violence for women that are in relationships with lower income men, but 
that working has a negative effect on domestic violence for women with higher 
income spouses/partners. There doesn’t appear to be any effect of domestic violence 
on employment for either of these two groups. 
 If the models of assortative matching in the marriage market are to be 
believed, these findings suggest that women who have lower income spouses/partners 
are more likely to also command a lower wage in the labor market. Because of this, 
they are also less likely to be entirely self-sufficient even if they choose to work. 
Thus, if their spouse/partner does not approve of their working, employment could 
increase the level and amount of conflicts and unfortunately not provide her with 
sufficient resources to leave the relationship. Conversely, women who have higher 
income spouses/partners are more likely to also command a higher wage in the labor 
market implying a higher likelihood of becoming self-sufficient. In this case, violence 
may actually push the woman out of the relationship, and thus will not be used to 
deter behavior if one of the goals of the spouse is to keep the relationship intact. 
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 These findings are troubling given that women with lower outside options are 
the ones that could potentially benefit the most from education, employment, and 
other programs aimed at victims of abuse. Unfortunately, unless such programs 
significantly improve the bargaining power of abuse victims they may actually have 
the unintended effect of making matters worse.  
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 1 discusses the 
relevant literature, section 2 presents the various theoretical relationships between 
employment and domestic violence as well as proposes a method for choosing 
between the various empirical models, section 3 describes the data used in the 
analysis, section 4 discusses the model selection process and presents the preferred 
model of analysis, section 5 presents the results of estimation, and section 6 
concludes.  
 
1. Literature 
 To date, the literature has analyzed the relationship between employment 
status of women and domestic violence from a number of different angles. Some 
propose that the direction of impact is that working has an impact on whether a 
woman will experience abuse, while others suggest that domestic violence actually 
affects whether a woman chooses to work. Regardless of the direction of impact 
assumed, most studies have suggested that the relationship between the two variables 
of interest depends at least in part on the characteristics of both the woman and the 
man. Finally, because the relationship between domestic violence and women’s 
employment is a much bigger issue in developing countries, a lot of focus has been 
placed on analysis within those regions. 
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 Those studies that maintain that employment has an effect on abuse typically 
find that the relationship depends upon the relative bargaining powers of both the 
male and female. For example, Heath (2012) finds in her study in Dhaka that women 
who have lower levels of education and marry at a young age tend to be more likely 
to generate abusive reactions from their spouses when they enter the workforce, but 
that there is no impact on abuse for women with better education who married later. 
Similarly, Macmillan and Gartner (1999) in a study of Canadian women find that 
women who choose to work when their husband is unemployed have an increase in 
the likelihood of abuse whereas women who choose to work when their husband is 
also employed actually see a decrease in the likelihood of abuse.  
 Aizer (2010) instead looks at the relationship between the relative wages of 
men and women instead of the actual employment status of the woman. She finds that 
increases in the relative wages of women generally decrease the likelihood of 
domestic violence. Higher wages mean more bargaining power and higher threat 
points, which means that the higher the wage the less likely violence will be able to be 
used as a deterrent to employment.   
 These findings are consistent with theoretical models such as Eswaran and 
Malhotra (2011), who predict that the effect of employment on domestic violence 
depends on how employment affects the relative bargaining power and threat point of 
the woman. Working should increase the decision-making power of the woman in the 
household. This could potentially lead to conflicts if the husband and wife do not 
agree on how household resources should be managed. For women who don’t see a 
large increase in their bargaining power, they may see an increase in the level of 
domestic violence which is being used by the male to regain his dominant role in the 
household. On the other hand, for women who do receive a substantial increase in 
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their relative bargaining power, working may actually deter abuse since the male 
wants to keep the relationship intact and his spouse/partner may leave him if he 
becomes abusive. 
 Another strain of the literature proposes that domestic violence impacts a 
woman’s decision to enter the workforce. One such study by Bowlus and Seitz (1998) 
finds that the effect of domestic violence on employment decisions depends on the 
marital status of the woman. For married or divorced women, abuse in current or past 
relationships negatively affects her decision to become employed. However, for 
women who are re-married current or past abuse increases the likelihood of entering 
the workforce.  
 Currently there do not appear to be any studies that look at the relationship 
between employment status and domestic violence and how the relationship differs by 
the income level of the spouse. This study proposes a rationale similar to Heath 
(2012) and Eswaran and Malhotra (2011) to explain why the relationship may differ 
by income levels. Women in relationships with men of lower incomes likely have 
lower ability levels and therefore fewer outside options, but women in relationships 
with higher income men likely have better outside options. This means that women in 
higher income households are more likely to be able to raise their threat point enough 
to deter domestic violence in response to employment, but that women in lower 
income households may not be able to raise their threat point enough. 
 Finally, no study to date has taken into account the potential dual relationship 
between domestic violence and employment status, though current studies have 
shown evidence for both directions of impact. This study will be the first to test 
multiple potential relationships between abuse and employment to determine the most 
appropriate model.  
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2. Theory 
We have seen that a variety of relationships between women’s employment 
and domestic violence may exist, however, most studies assume one direction of 
impact or the other and do not allow for other relationships to exist. Given the 
empirical evidence to date, there seems to be a valid concern that the actual 
relationship may be more complicated than previously thought.  
In addition to the uncertain direction of impact, it is also unclear whether the 
relationship between domestic violence and employment status is driven by the actual 
presence of violence and actual employment, or rather by underlying conditions that 
are correlated with one or both. To explore the possibilities more fully, I adapt Milli’s 
(2013) method to the problem at hand. Consider the following system of equations: 
(1)                    
        
(2)                    
        
where D* is a latent variable that indicates the underlying state of a relationship, and 
D is an indicator that takes a value of 1 (indicating a violent relationship) if     . 
W* is a latent variable that represents the temptation to enter the workforce, and W is 
an indicator which takes a value of 1 (indicating the respondent being employed) if 
    . X is a vector of variables that influence both violence and working status, Y 
a vector of variables that influence only violence, and Z a vector of variables that 
influence only employment. The error terms   and   may also be correlated, possibly 
because unobserved factors affect both outcomes. This possible correlation will 
motivate the bivariate probit model used in the empirical estimation.  
 This system allows for several potential relationships between violence and 
employment status. We are particularly interested in the coefficients   ,   ,   , and 
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  . Each may or may not be equal to zero, depending on which factors are important 
in determining the relationship.  
 In the analysis that is carried out in this paper I test three different 
relationships that are nested in this system. Two of which have been used in the 
literature, the other is one that proposes an indirect relationship between the two 
variables of interest. A discussion of the three models that will be estimated follows. 
2.1 Baseline Model: Indirect Effects 
 In this baseline model I assume that domestic violence has no direct impact on 
employment and employment has no direct impact on domestic violence. Rather, the 
underlying states that determine both violence and employment affect one another. 
This gives us the following system of equations: 
(3)                    
    
(4)                    
    
Again, W* and D* are unobservable in this model and as such    and    cannot be 
estimated directly.  
 To estimate    and    I estimate the reduced form of the system above by 
plugging D* into the W* equation and vice versa. The coefficients of interest then can 
be found by calculating different ratios of the excluded exogenous variables. There 
will be multiple estimates of each of these coefficients, so they must also be tested for 
equality. 
 It is unclear what relationship will emerge in this scenario as several are 
theoretically plausible. For instance, a higher temptation to enter the workforce may 
provoke a reaction in terms of abuse. Further this reaction may differ by income 
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levels, as women in higher income households likely have higher outside options and 
may effectively use employment as a deterrent to abuse.  
 The underlying state of the relationship may also influence a woman’s 
decision of whether to work. Abuse is not the only factor that women consider when 
choosing to leave or stay. If the relationship is significantly bad, a woman may 
consider leaving the relationship and thus choose to find employment to increase the 
amount of resources she has if she does decide to leave. However, if employment 
would not earn her sufficient resources she may choose not to work and become more 
compliant with her spouse/partner in order to prevent abuse in the future. 
2.2 Domestic Violence Effect Model 
 One of the models that has dominated the literature proposes that a woman’s 
choice to enter the workforce depends on the actual presence of violence in the 
relationship, but that employment does not influence whether a relationship is 
abusive. I add to this model by also allowing for domestic violence to have an indirect 
effect on a woman’s choice of employment. This model simplifies the original system 
of equations to the following: 
(5)                   
(6)                    
        
As with the baseline model D* is unobservable meaning that    must again be 
estimated through ratios of reduced form estimates. Note that if    is found to be 
significant in the baseline model, the model can be further simplified and the reduced 
form estimation will not be necessary. 
A woman may choose to start working in response to a relationship becoming 
abusive. This could be for a number of reasons. She could be attempting to gain the 
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monetary and social resources that she needs to leave the relationship. She could also 
choose to work as an attempt to get away from the abuse by spending more time away 
from home. This suggests that perhaps   >0.  
 This positive relationship is more likely to be observed in higher income 
households where women typically have better outside options. Working could bring 
her the resources that she needs to leave, and thus provide the woman with greater 
bargaining power in the future to deter violent behavior.  
 On the other hand if working does not provide a significant enough 
improvement in the woman’s bargaining power, i.e. her income from working is not 
high enough, she may not be able to leave the relationship and abuse may be an 
effective deterrent to future employment. Situations such as these are very common 
particularly among low income households (see Allard et al [1996] for examples).  
2.3 Employment Effect Model 
 Another model that has dominated the literature suggests that women’s 
employment has an impact on the level of abuse that she experiences but that abuse 
has no impact on her choice of employment. This analysis also allows for the 
possibility that the temptation to enter the workforce also influences whether a 
relationship is abusive. The appropriate system of equations for this model 
specification is: 
(7)                     
        
(8)                   
A similar method of estimation to the domestic violence effect model will be applied 
to this model. Again, if    is found to be insignificant in the baseline model the 
estimated model can be further simplified.  
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The direction of this effect is likely a function of several factors including the 
spouse’s income and the woman’s predicted wage should she enter the workforce. On 
one hand the male may be attempting to control her and feels threatened by her 
working. It could be that he wants to keep her isolated from friends and family, and 
entering the workforce would give her access to a wider social network. It could also 
be that he has strong views on gender roles and feels that her entering the workforce is 
a signal that he is failing to adequately provide for his family. Both scenarios suggest 
a positive relationship between women’s employment and domestic violence. In other 
words   >0.  
 There are some reasons to believe that this relationship may be more likely in 
households with low incomes. Women who are in a relationship with low income men 
are more likely to also have low incomes should they choose to work. If this is the 
case then domestic violence could be an effective deterrent to working since the low 
income would likely not be enough for the woman to become self-sufficient and 
ultimately be able to leave if necessary. 
 Conversely, having two earners in a household eases financial stress which 
could potentially reduce the number of arguments that could turn violent. The woman 
may also be able to leave the relationship if her income is high enough. If one of the 
goals of the spouse is to keep the relationship intact, then he may actually reduce the 
level of violence or refrain from using it altogether. This suggests that perhaps   >0. 
 Similarly, there are reasons to believe that this relationship may be more likely 
in households with high incomes. Women that are in relationships with higher income 
men are more likely to also have higher incomes should they choose to work. Because 
higher incomes mean higher threat points and more bargaining power for women, 
they can use their bargaining power to drive down the level of violence. 
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2.4 Model Selection Procedure  
While some of the proposed theoretical relationships may seem more valid 
than others, none can be completely ruled out. Because of this, a theoretically agnostic 
approach to finding the correct specification will be used.  
Each of the three models will initially be estimated with a bivariate probit 
model to test the assumption that   and   are correlated with one another. If we 
cannot reject that the correlation between the two error terms is equal to zero, then 
two separate probit models will be used instead. 
Ideally this model selection procedure would also estimate the full model in 
which both employment and domestic violence were allowed to simultaneously 
determine one another. However, the system of equations cannot be properly 
estimated with the bivariate probit model when both domestic violence and 
employment are mutually determined (see Heckman [1978]). Thus only models that 
are partially nested in the full model will be tested. 
This estimation strategy will allow us to test all of the previously proposed 
models in the literature as well as add a layer of complexity by allowing the 
underlying states determining violence and employment to have an impact. When 
applied to the data, we should be able to determine which model best fits the data and 
thus best describes the relationship between employment and domestic violence. A 
nice feature of this estimation strategy is that it also allows employment and domestic 
violence to be related even if   ,   ,   , and    are all found to be zero through the 
correlation between the error terms. 
 The model that is selected as the preferred model will be chosen based on 
whether it shows a significant relationship between the variables of interest, if any 
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other model specifications find significant relationships, and what the log likelihood 
of the model is compared with other model specifications. 
 
3. Data 
The data used in this analysis come from the National Survey of Families and 
Households (NSFH), a nationally representative longitudinal survey of 13,017 adult 
respondents interviewed in three separate waves: 1987-88, 1992-94, and 2001-2003. 
While other data sets such as the National Crime Victimization Survey also have 
information on both domestic violence and employment status, the NSFH provides a 
richer set of variables that give information on not only the respondent but the 
spouse/partner, family environment, and the respondent’s experience growing up. In 
addition, the survey questions regarding domestic violence were worded in such a 
way as to encourage self-reporting. The survey question reads as “During the past 
year, how many fights with your partner resulted in him/her hitting, shoving, or 
throwing things at you?”. Because this survey question does not rely on incidents 
being reported to the police, the potential number of incidence reported is much 
higher than most other surveys. 
Unfortunately, due to funding issues, geographic information for each 
respondent is unavailable in wave 3, so state-level variables for the respondent’s state 
of residence cannot be included. To address this issue I use state of birth as a proxy 
for state of residence in all three waves. Birth state is used for two reasons: 1) because 
over half of the sample still lives in their state of birth, and 2) while I do know 
whether the respondent’s state is the same in wave 3 as it was in wave 2 there may be 
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non-random reasons why it is not the same, whereas the reasons why current state and 
birth state are different are much more likely to be random. 
Because we are interested in the relationship between domestic violence and 
employment status and how it differs by income levels, two samples will be drawn 
from the data set. The first sample, the low income household sample, contains all 
respondents whose spouse/partner had an income at or below the median value. 
Likewise, the second sample, the high income household sample, contains all 
respondents whose spouse/partner had an income above the median value. Spousal 
income was used in lieu of household income because the cut-off point between low 
and high income households would become a function of the woman’s income as well 
and therefore be dependent on whether she was working. 
Both samples are restricted to include only women who are either married or 
cohabiting with an intimate partner at the time of the interview as domestic violence 
data are not available for other women. In addition to the lack of geographical 
information, wave 3 was limited to include only respondents who had a “focal child” 
available at the time the wave 2 interview was conducted. A focal child is simply a 
child of the respondent about whom additional questions were asked at each 
interview. Because of this, I also exclude respondents in waves 1 and 2 who do not fit 
this same selection criteria. This resulted in only a minor sample reduction (185 
observations were lost). 
Information on the respondent’s demographic characteristics such as age and 
race, her education level, and her and her spouse’s income are included in the data set. 
In addition to these individual and couple characteristics, we are also interested in 
some state-level variables such as the average log wages for men and women, birth 
rates, and the unemployment rate.  
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3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for both the low and high income 
samples. The victimization rate appears to vary slightly by income level with lower 
income households being slightly more susceptible to violence at 6.3 percent versus 
only 4.1 percent for higher income households. This pattern is consistent with 
findings in other surveys including the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Intimate Partner 
Violence in the U.S. study that finds that the prevalence of domestic violence is the 
highest for very low income groups and gradually declines as household incomes rise. 
It is also consistent with the theory that women who have spouses/partners who have 
higher incomes tend to have better outside options, so that these women are more 
likely to leave violent partners. 
 This theory is further supported by the observation that women that have 
spouses/partners with high incomes have higher education levels than women in low 
income households, implying that they would likely also have high incomes should 
they choose to work. One additional implication of this finding is that women in 
higher income households are also more likely to be able to attract a wider range of 
potential partners, thus husbands/partners are less likely to be abusive for fear that the 
woman will leave.  
 One final thing we notice is that women in lower income households are less 
likely to be married and more likely to be cohabiting with their partners. This is not 
surprising, although it is difficult to determine what this may mean in terms of these 
women’s experience with domestic abuse without analyzing the issue further.  
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4. Model Selection 
 I use the NSFH data to analyze the relationship between a woman’s working 
status and her experience with domestic violence. The model selection procedure 
discussed in section 2 is run on both “low income” and “high income” households to 
see if the relationship differs by family background. 
 Because the fully specified model outlined in section 2 is not identified using 
standard modeling techniques we can only test models which are partially nested. 
Thus, three different model specifications will be tested. The baseline model will test 
whether a woman’s temptation to enter the workforce and the underlying state of the 
relationship have any effect on one another. The second model tests whether abuse 
has any effect on whether a woman chooses to work. Finally, the third model tests 
whether a woman working has any effect on whether she experiences abuse. It is 
obvious based on theory that each of these models could be justified, thus the model 
selection procedure to be carried out will give us a better idea of which relationship is 
best fits the data. 
 A bivariate probit model is run initially to see if there is a significant 
correlation between the error terms in the domestic violence and working status 
equations. If no such correlation is found, then two separate probit models may be run 
without loss of efficiency. 
 In order to identify each equation in the system, a set of excluded exogenous 
variables is required for both equations. In the domestic violence equation, state-level 
variables indicating whether unilateral divorce is allowed as well as the ratio of single 
men to single women are included. These variables should only affect the welfare 
decision indirectly through how they affect the level of violence and the woman’s 
outside option. Stevenson and Wolfers (2006), for example, found that the presence of 
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unilateral divorce laws significantly decreased domestic violence rates, making it a 
promising candidate for an excluded exogenous variable. The relative supply and 
demand of single men to women should also affect domestic violence rates because it 
measures one of the woman’s outside options. Women who have better options 
outside of the relationship should be less willing to tolerate abuse. The higher this 
ratio is then, the greater the likelihood the woman can find another partner if she 
should leave her current relationship. Thus, we expect the effect of this ratio on 
domestic violence rates to be negative.  
Further, we might expect these variables to have differing effects for women 
in higher and lower income households. Women in higher income households likely 
have better access to the resources necessary to carry out divorce proceedings and 
thus the impact of unilateral divorce laws is likely higher for them. Similarly, women 
in higher income households, working or not, likely enjoy an increased ability to 
attract potential partners and so we might expect the effect of the ratio of single men 
to single women to have a stronger impact for women in higher income households. 
 Also included in the domestic violence equation is a set of dummy variables 
indicating the religion observed by the household. A set of dummies is used in lieu of 
a simple indicator of religious affiliation because views on gender roles likely differ 
across religions. For this analysis atheist is treated as the excluded dummy. A small 
literature has examined the relationship between religion and domestic violence and it 
is typically found that regular attendance of religious gatherings has an inverse 
relationship with domestic violence rates. Ellison and Anderson (2002), for example, 
use the NSFH to analyze this relationship and find that even after controlling for 
various individual and social factors that may affect violence, regular attendance 
negatively affects violence rates. 
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 The employment status equation contains information on whether the 
respondent’s mother worked while she was growing up. Blau and Ferber (1991) for 
example find that women’s labor force participation does significantly depend on 
family background and suggest that having a mother who worked a significant portion 
of the years her children were growing up provides motivation for women to pursue 
higher education and a career.  
Also included in the employment status equation is a state-level variable that 
measures the birth rate. It has been shown in numerous studies that there is an inverse 
relationship between birth rates and women’s labor force participation (see Mishra 
and Smyth [2010] or Bloom et al [2009] for example) suggesting that women may 
drop out of the workforce to take care of their children if the birth rate is particularly 
high.  
Finally, an estimate of the woman’s wage should she choose to work is 
included in the employment equation. This predicted wage was generated using CPS 
data from the relevant years to create an out-of-sample estimate. Once the wage 
equation was estimated with the CPS data, the NSFH data was used to generate a 
predicted value
4
. It is also logical to think that the predicted earnings for women and a 
woman’s decision to work are highly correlated with one another and that the 
direction of this relationship depends on whether the income or substitution effects are 
greater. If the predicted wage of given a number of hours worked per week is high, we 
may see that an increase in the wage rate actually decreases women’s labor force 
participation on average. Similarly, if the predicted wage given a number of hours 
                                                 
4
 The excluded exogenous variable in this estimation strategy was the log average earnings of women 
in the respondent’s state. 
56 
 
 
worked per week is low, we may see that an increase in the wage rate increases 
women’s labor force participation (see Mincer [1962]).  
Table 1.2 presents the key results of the model selection procedure. A more 
detailed discussion of the results will be deferred until the most appropriate model for 
the data has been chosen. 
4.1 Baseline Model 
 The first model estimated that        . In other words, we are estimating 
whether the temptation to enter the workforce affects violence rates as well as 
whether the underlying state of the relationship affects women’s labor force 
participation. Recall that due to the nature of the variables of interest W* and D*, the 
model estimated is a reduced form model. Since the coefficients    and    are 
estimated using different combinations of coefficients on the excluded exogenous 
variables there will be multiple estimates for each coefficient. A X
2
 test is run on 
these estimates to test whether they are equal to each other and whether they are 
jointly equal to zero.  
 Immediately we see that regardless of income level the temptation to work and 
the underlying state of the relationship do not appear to significantly affect one 
another. We do, however, observe an indirect relationship between our two variables 
of interest through the correlation of their error terms. In both the low and high 
income groups there appears to be a positive correlation between the error terms 
implying that unobservable factors that affect working status also positively affect 
domestic violence and vice versa. Because of this significant correlation, the bivariate 
probit model is indeed appropriate.  
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 For more detailed information on the results of this model, see Table 2A.1 in 
the Appendix.  
4.2 Domestic Violence Effect 
In the next model the assumption that        is relaxed by allowing domestic 
violence to have a direct effect on whether a woman chooses to work. Further, 
because both    and    were found to be insignificant in the baseline model they have 
been excluded from estimation and no reduced form estimation is necessary. 
 We can see that while domestic violence has a negative effect on working for 
both income groups, we cannot conclude that this effect is significantly different from 
zero. However, like the baseline model, we do conclude that there is an indirect 
relationship between the two variables of interest through the correlation of their error 
terms and that the bivariate probit model is picking up on that and correcting for it. 
 Finally, we can see from the full results that are found in Table 2A.2 in the 
appendix that both equations do have significant excluded exogenous variables in 
both income groups. For domestic violence it appears that religion has strong 
predictive power (almost all religion dummies were negative and significant), 
suggesting that strong religious beliefs are associated with lower domestic violence 
rates which is consistent with the findings of Ellison and Anderson (2002). For 
employment status, higher predicted wages for women appear to increase the 
likelihood of a woman being employed.  
4.3 The Employment Effect 
 In the last model we relax the assumption that      by allowing a woman’s 
employment status to affect the likelihood of abuse. Similar to the previous model, we 
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are assuming that the temptation to work and the underlying state of the relationship 
have no effect.  
 This time we see that a woman’s choice to work does have a significant 
impact on the likelihood that she will experience abuse in both income groups and this 
impact is positive for low income households and negative for high income 
households. Further, both equations do have significant excluded exogenous variables 
for both income groups indicating that our system is indeed identified. Finally, we 
cannot reject that the correlation between the error terms is zero, thus necessitating the 
bivariate probit model again. 
 Upon analyzing the results of all three model specifications we can reject the 
baseline model relative to both the working effect and domestic violence effect 
models through a likelihood ratio test. In addition, we see that the working effect and 
domestic violence effect models produce almost identical log likelihoods, but because 
the variables of interest are only significant in the working effect model and because 
of the significance of a greater number of excluded exogenous variables we reject the 
domestic violence effect model in favor of the working effect model. Thus, we arrive 
at the conclusion that the preferred model based on the model selection exercise is: 
(9)                       
(10)                   
where   and   are distributed joint normally.  
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5. Results 
 Estimates of the coefficients for the preferred model can again be found in 
Table 2.3 and corresponding estimates of each variable’s marginal effect can be found 
in Table 2.4.  
5.1 Low Income Households 
 The results for the low income household group indicate that there is a strong 
positive relationship between a woman working and her experience of domestic 
violence. Specifically, working increases the likelihood that a woman will be a victim 
of abuse by a factor of 3.3. This implies that for the average woman, the likelihood of 
abuse increases from just over 6 percent to just under 20 percent if she chooses to 
work, ceteris paribus, which is quite a substantial effect. 
 There are several possible reasons why we might observe this particular 
relationship. Among them is the possibility that men with lower incomes may feel 
increased pressure to provide for their families and may feel a sense of shame if his 
spouse or partner enters the workforce in order to increase the household income 
level. This shame could then manifest itself in the form of abuse. Further, since 
women who are with partners with lower incomes typically have characteristics that 
make them less able to find employment with high wages (i.e. lower education 
levels), working may not provide sufficient resources needed to leave the relationship 
if necessary, and therefore abuse could be used as an effective deterrent for future 
work. 
 Also of note is the fact that both equations have several significant excluded 
exogenous variables, indicating that the model is properly identified. For domestic 
violence, the religious preference of the spouse appears to matter a great deal. Most 
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religious denomination dummies were significant and had a negative impact on 
domestic violence. The respondent’s state of birth having a unilateral divorce law was 
also found to significantly reduce the likelihood of abuse.  
 For working status, having a mother that worked while she was growing up 
increased the likelihood that the respondent also worked. Having such a role model 
while growing up likely created similar ambitions in the respondent as Balu and 
Ferber (1991) point out.   
 Finally, the correlation between the error terms in the two equations is quite 
high (0.885) and the hypothesis that the correlation is equal to zero can be rejected, 
thus the bivariate probit model is justified. 
5.2 High Income Households 
 While a woman being employed had a positive effect on the likelihood of 
domestic violence for women in low income households, it has a substantial negative 
effect for women in high income households. Specifically, working decreases the 
likelihood that a woman will become a victim of abuse by a factor of 5.6 which 
implies that for the average woman, the likelihood of being abused would drop from 
about 4 percent to 0.7 percent ceteris paribus. In other words, entering the workforce 
will nearly eliminate the possibility of abuse for the average woman in a high income 
household. 
 The fact that working has a negative effect on abuse for women in high 
income households but a positive effect for women in low income households seems 
to suggest something about attitudes about women in the workforce as well as 
differences in the outside options for women in these two income groups. Presumably 
money issues are less of a problem in high income households, and therefore a 
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woman choosing to work is likely not seen as a failure to provide for his family on the 
part of the male, but as an expression of the woman’s choice to enter the workforce. 
As a result, he is less likely to respond to her decision with violence. Indeed, we also 
see that for women in higher income households, an increase in the proportion of 
women working drastically reduces the likelihood that she will be abused which 
suggests that men with higher incomes appear to be more tolerant of women’s 
changing roles in the economy. 
 On the other hand money issues are often a bone of contention within lower 
income households. If a woman chooses to enter the workforce in this situation, the 
male may interpret this as a sign that she thinks that he is not doing an adequate job of 
providing for his family and may retaliate with violence. Unlike with the high income 
households, having an increase in the proportion of women in the workforce has no 
impact on the likelihood of abuse for women in low income households, suggesting 
that the male’s attitude toward women in the workforce is not necessarily a function 
of what is considered the norm in society. 
 Further, we also suggested earlier that women in higher income households 
likely have better outside options. We saw that they were typically more educated and 
because of this they are likely more able to earn incomes at least as high as the 
average, and they are also likely better able to attract new partners should they leave. 
Because their outside options are better, we think this will reduce the likelihood that 
the spouse/partner will become abusive. Comparing the results from both the low and 
high income household samples enables us to see just that. A one unit increase in the 
ratio of single men to single women reduces the likelihood of being victimized by a 
factor of 2.7 for women in high income households, but has no significant effect for 
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low income households, suggesting that indeed these women are probably more likely 
to find a new partner if they chose to, thus deterring any violent acts by her partner.  
 Again we see that both equations have significant excluded exogenous 
variables. For domestic violence the ratio of single men to single women matters as 
well as the religious affiliation of the spouse. For employment status, the predicted 
wage for the respondent appears to matter. Finally, because we can reject the 
hypothesis that the correlation between the error terms in both equations is zero, the 
bivariate probit model is also valid for the high income group. 
5.3 Robustness Check 
 As a robustness check, the sample was divided into three income groups 
instead of two to see if the results were robust to changes in the income cutoff points. 
A similar model selection procedure was carried out at each income level and it was 
found that the preferred model for each income level was still one in which 
employment impacted domestic violence but not vice versa. Coefficients of the 
preferred model can be found in Table 2.5. Note that these should be compared to the 
coefficient estimates of the two-income group model specification found in Table 2.3.  
 The relationship between employment status and domestic violence is still 
preserved despite the different household income thresholds. Employment appears to 
have a strong positive influence for both the low and middle income levels, yet a 
strong negative influence for the high income level. While the excluded exogenous 
variables do lose some of their predictive power, these results are consistent with what 
was found earlier, suggesting that the results are indeed robust to changes in the cutoff 
point. 
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6. Conclusion 
 The findings of this study are worrying in light of the push to provide more 
jobs to women in an effort to promote gender equality. They suggest that such efforts 
may have unintended consequences on the women they are aimed at helping in the 
form of the risk of increased domestic violence. This paper has shown that women 
who are in relationships with lower income spouses are actually more likely to 
become victims of abuse if they enter the workforce. Conversely women who are in 
relationships with higher income men become less likely to be victimized by entering 
the workforce. 
 These results are consistent with models that posit that males may use violence 
as an instrument to control their wives and to regain the dominant role in the 
household. Women in lower income households are more likely to have lower outside 
options, and thus less bargaining power to begin with. By entering the workforce, 
these women may see an increase in their outside options by entering the workforce, 
but not enough to effectively allow them to leave the relationship if it becomes 
abusive. On the other hand, women in higher income households are likely to have 
higher initial outside options, and thus more bargaining power. Working will also 
increase their bargaining power, but it has greater potential to raise their bargaining 
power sufficiently to actually deter violence. 
 The findings of this study suggest that programs aimed at providing work 
opportunities for women, particularly those of lower skill levels, may need to have 
supplementary programs that target domestic abuse as well such as access to 
counseling, women’s shelters, and perhaps educational programs aimed at boosting 
these women’s outside options. 
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Tables 
 
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics (All Waves)  
Variable Average Value 
(Low Income Households) 
Average Value 
(High Income Households) 
Domestic Violence 0.063 
(0.242) 
0.041 
(0.199) 
Working 0.912 
(0.283) 
0.929 
(0.257) 
Age 43.715 
(13.081) 
42.312 
(10.437) 
Education 11.731 
(4.106) 
13.279 
(3.207) 
Number of Children 2.197 
(1.612) 
2.223 
(1.705) 
Log Spouse Income 5.542 
(4.641) 
10.723 
(0.494) 
Black 0.167 
(0.373) 
0.147 
(0.354) 
Hispanic 0.071 
(0.256) 
0.049 
(0.215) 
Cohabiting 0.057 
(0.232) 
0.032 
(0.175) 
Northeast 0.174 
(0.379) 
0.205 
(0.404) 
South 0.399 
(0.490) 
0.370 
(0.483) 
West 0.133 
(0.340) 
0.125 
(0.331) 
Unemployment Rate 5.733 
(1.344) 
5.700 
(1.278) 
% Females Working 0.726 
(0.054) 
0.727 
(0.052) 
Mother Worked 0.533 
(0.499) 
0.537 
(0.499) 
Birth Rate 14.965 
(2.014) 
14.991 
(1.951) 
Log Female Earnings 9.235 
(0.355) 
9.218 
(0.328) 
Unilateral Divorce 0.543 
(0.498) 
0.512 
(0.500) 
Single Sex Ratio 1.088 
(0.059) 
1.091 
(0.060) 
Number of Observations 2920 3070 
Notes: 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Income values in constant 1988 dollars. 
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Table 2.2: Model Selection Procedure Summary 
 Low Income Households High Income Households 
Variable Coefficient 
(D.V. Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(Working Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(D.V. Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(Working Eq.) 
Baseline Model 
D* (X2 test: estimates jointly equal to 0) 
     p-value in parentheses 
 (0.466)  (0.700) 
W* (X2 test: estimates jointly equal to 0) 
     p-value in parentheses 
(0.925) 
 
 
 
(0.906) 
 
 
 
Number of Observations 
Log pseudolikelihood 
Wald test of Rho=0: 
N = 2920 
L = -1380.7 
Rho = 0.213 
 
 
p-value = 0.027 
N = 3070 
L = -1175.2 
Rho = -0.241 
 
 
p-value = 0.007 
Domestic Violence Effect Model 
Domestic Violence  -0.602 
(0.735) 
 -1.213 
(0.914) 
X2 test: 
Excluded Exogenous Variables Jointly = 0 
     p-values in parentheses 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.490) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.124) 
Number of Observations 
Log pseudolikelihood 
Wald test of Rho=0: 
N = 2920 
L = -1408.7 
Rho = 0.351 
 
 
p-value = 0.032 
N = 3070 
L = -1192.1 
Rho = -0.613 
 
 
p-value = 0.021 
Working Effect Model 
Working 1.739*** 
(0.107) 
 -2.163** 
(1.023) 
 
X2 test: 
Excluded Exogenous Variables Jointly = 0 
     p-values in parentheses 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.048) 
Number of Observations 
Log pseudolikelihood 
Wald test of Rho=0: 
N = 2920 
L = -1398.0 
Rho = 0.885 
 
 
p-value = 0.000 
N = 3070 
L = -1191.8 
Rho = -0.508 
 
 
p-value = 0.000 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors clustered on birth state in parentheses unless otherwise noted. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels. 
 
  
68 
 
 
Table 2.3: Coefficient Estimates of Preferred Model (Working Effect) 
 Low Income Households High Income Households 
Variable Coefficient 
(D.V. Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(Working Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(D.V. Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(Working Eq.) 
Working 1.739*** 
(0.107) 
 -2.163** 
(1.023) 
 
Age -0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.018*** 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
Education -0.001 
(0.007) 
0.024 
(0.018) 
-0.008 
(0.012) 
0.010 
(0.012) 
Number of Children 0.016 
(0.019) 
0.004 
(0.023) 
-0.005 
(0.026) 
0.002 
(0.028) 
Black -0.012 
(0.080) 
-0.078 
(0.085) 
0.125 
(0.120) 
0.050 
(0.134) 
Hispanic 0.163 
(0.110) 
-0.075 
(0.116) 
0.167 
(0.237) 
-0.156 
(0.158) 
Cohabiting 0.948*** 
(0.105) 
0.069 
(0.132) 
1.817*** 
(0.210) 
0.181 
(0.303) 
Log Spouse Income -0.006 
(0.008) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.028 
(0.094) 
-0.084 
(0.069) 
Northeast -0.176* 
(0.091) 
0.179* 
(0.097) 
0.042 
(0.102) 
0.164* 
(0.098) 
South -0.154** 
(0.074) 
0.065 
(0.078) 
-0.197* 
(0.110) 
0.067 
(0.093) 
West -0.282*** 
(0.105) 
0.267** 
(0.113) 
0.045 
(0.123) 
0.181* 
(0.108) 
Unemployment Rate -0.003 
(0.028) 
0.026 
(0.030) 
0.013 
(0.035) 
-0.004 
(0.032) 
% Women Working -0.479 
(0.827) 
1.112* 
(0.623) 
-1.885* 
(1.113) 
0.118 
(0.957) 
Wave 2 0.043 
(0.079) 
0.047 
(0.089) 
0.275** 
(0.117) 
0.138* 
(0.095) 
Wave 3 0.161* 
(0.142) 
-0.015 
(0.149) 
0.434*** 
(0.133) 
0.216 
(0.154) 
Excluded Exogenous Variables 
Domestic Violence:     
     Unilateral Divorce -0.056* 
(0.028) 
 -0.010 
(0.097) 
 
     Single Sex Ratio -0.206 
(0.320) 
 1.055* 
(0.600) 
 
     Religion ***  ***  
Working:     
     Mother Worked  0.071** 
(0.033) 
 0.015 
(0.087) 
     Birth Rate  -0.006 
(0.009) 
 0.010 
(0.026) 
     Predicted Wage  -0.268 
(0.175) 
 0.513*** 
(0.151) 
X2 test: 
Excluded Exogenous Variables Jointly = 0 
(p-values in parentheses) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.048) 
Number of Observations 
Log pseudolikelihood 
Wald test of Rho=0: 
N = 2920 
L = -1398.0 
Rho = 0.885 
 
 
p-value = 0.000 
N = 3070 
L = -1191.8 
Rho = -0.508 
 
 
p-value = 0.000 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors clustered on birth state in parentheses unless otherwise noted. 
Individual dummies indicating religious denomination were also included in the domestic violence equation. The 
significance test is a test of all dummies being jointly equal to 0.  
All Income values are in constant 1988 dollars. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels. 
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Table 2.4: Marginal Effects Estimates of Preferred Model (Working Effect) 
 Low Income Households High Income Households 
Variable Coefficient 
(D.V. Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(Working Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(D.V. Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(Working Eq.) 
Working 3.260*** 
(0.223) 
 -5.554** 
(2.511) 
 
Age -0.023*** 
(0.006) 
4.30x10-4 
(4.82x10-4) 
-0.045*** 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Education -0.002 
(0.016) 
-2.82x10-4 
(0.001) 
-0.020 
(0.031) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Number of Children 0.038 
(0.035) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.013 
(0.067) 
2.59x10-4 
(0.004) 
Black -0.005 
(0.136) 
-0.011 
(0.013) 
0.322 
(0.307) 
0.007 
(0.019) 
Hispanic 0.319* 
(0.173) 
-0.012 
(0.019) 
0.429 
(0.607) 
-0.023 
(0.023) 
Cohabiting 1.781*** 
(0.287) 
0.013 
(0.024) 
4.667*** 
(0.607) 
0.026 
(0.044) 
Log Spouse Income -0.013 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.071 
(0.242) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
Northeast -0.331 
(0.212) 
0.025 
(0.019) 
0.107 
(0.263) 
0.024* 
(0.014) 
South -0.296** 
(0.137) 
0.009 
(0.015) 
-0.505* 
(0.287) 
0.010 
(0.013) 
West -0.535*** 
(0.203) 
0.045** 
(0.020) 
0.117 
(0.315) 
0.026* 
(0.016) 
Unemployment Rate -0.005 
(0.056) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.034 
(0.090) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
% Women Working -0.915 
(1.747) 
0.245* 
(0.130) 
-4.841* 
(2.567) 
0.017 
(0.140) 
Wave 2 0.078 
(0.144) 
0.019 
(0.015) 
0.705** 
(0.307) 
0.020* 
(0.012) 
Wave 3 0.387* 
(0.224) 
-0.001 
(0.022) 
1.115*** 
(0.350) 
0.031 
(0.022) 
Excluded Exogenous Variables 
Domestic Violence:     
     Unilateral Divorce -0.105* 
(0.042) 
 -0.025 
(0.249) 
 
     Single Sex Ratio -0.465 
(0.594) 
 2.709* 
(1.546) 
 
     Religion ***  ***  
Working:     
     Mother Worked  0.012** 
(0.007) 
 0.002 
(0.013) 
     Birth Rate  -0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.001 
(0.004) 
     Predicted Wage  -0.038 
(0.027) 
 0.088*** 
(0.025) 
Number of Observations 
Log pseudolikelihood 
Wald test of Rho=0: 
N = 2920 
L = -1396.7 
Rho = -0.985 
 
 
p-value = 0.000 
N = 3070 
L = -1191.8 
Rho = 0.804 
 
 
p-value = 0.000 
Notes: 
All marginal effects are partial elasticities of the form dlogPr(y=1)/dx and are the sum of the direct 
and indirect effects when applicable. 
Robust standard errors clustered on birth state in parentheses. 
Individual dummies indicating religious denomination were also included in the domestic violence 
equation. The significance test is a test of all dummies being jointly equal to 0.  
All Income values are in constant 1988 dollars. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels. 
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Table 2.5: Robustness Check Coefficient Estimates (Working Effect by 3 Income Levels) 
 Low Income Households Middle Income Households High Income Households 
Variable Coefficient 
(D.V. Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(Working Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(D.V. Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(Working Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(D.V. Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(Working Eq.) 
Working 1.723*** 
(0.133) 
 1.666*** 
(0.145) 
 -3.155*** 
(0.105) 
 
Excluded Exogenous Variables 
Domestic Violence:       
     Unilateral Divorce -0.070 
(0.049) 
 0.043 
(0.059) 
 -0.119 
(0.093) 
 
     Single Sex Ratio -0.247 
(0.485) 
 -0.026 
(0.393) 
 0.780 
(0.822) 
 
     Religion ***  ***  ***  
Working:       
     Mother Worked  0.069 
(0.047) 
 0.034 
(0.061) 
 0.007 
(0.102) 
     Birth Rate  0.017 
(0.021) 
 0.017 
(0.021) 
 -0.028 
(0.019) 
     Predicted Wage  0.208 
(0.185) 
 0.525*** 
(0.201) 
 0.427** 
(0.175) 
X2 test: 
Excluded Exogenous Variables Jointly = 0 
(p-values in parentheses) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.3534) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.065) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.034) 
Number of Observations 
Log pseudolikelihood 
Wald test of Rho=0: 
N = 2095 
L = -1003.4 
Rho = 0.723 
 
 
p-value = 0.008 
N = 1809 
L = -766.6 
Rho = 0.798 
 
 
p-value = 0.048 
N = 2086 
L = -770.7 
Rho = -0.327 
 
 
p-value = 0.000 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors clustered on birth state in parentheses unless otherwise noted. 
Individual dummies indicating religious denomination were also included in the domestic violence equation. The significance test is a test of all dummies 
being jointly equal to 0.  
All Income values are in constant 1988 dollars. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels. 
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Appendix: Full Results of Model Selection 
 
Table 2A.1: Model Selection Coefficient Estimates (Baseline Model) 
 Low Income Households High Income Households 
Variable Coefficient 
(D.V. Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(Working Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(D.V. Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(Working Eq.) 
D* (X2 test: estimates jointly = 0) 
 
 (0.466)  (0.700) 
W* (X2 test: estimates jointly = 0) 
 
(0.925)  (0.906)  
Age -0.022*** 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
Education -0.014** 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.013) 
0.007 
(0.012) 
Number of Children 0.021 
(0.028) 
-0.023 
(0.019) 
-0.007 
(0.028) 
0.003 
(0.030) 
Black -0.076 
(0.105) 
-0.068 
(0.084) 
0.118 
(0.126) 
0.045 
(0.132) 
Hispanic 0.227 
(0.156) 
-0.066 
(0.129) 
0.145 
(0.258) 
-0.070 
(0.151) 
Cohabiting 1.457*** 
(0.201) 
0.082 
(0.136) 
1.891*** 
(0.214) 
0.202 
(0.252) 
Log Spouse Income -0.003 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.027 
(0.087) 
-0.087 
(0.070) 
Northeast -0.163 
(0.113) 
0.056 
(0.115) 
0.051 
(0.110) 
0.084 
(0.095) 
South -0.217** 
(0.109) 
0.021 
(0.077) 
-0.191 
(0.117) 
0.025 
(0.099) 
West -0.299* 
(0.163) 
0.228* 
(0.135) 
0.031 
(0.134) 
0.183 
(0.120) 
Unemployment Rate 0.013 
(0.044) 
0.019 
(0.029) 
0.028 
(0.036) 
-0.013 
(0.030) 
% Women Working 0.136 
(1.119) 
1.774* 
(1.075) 
-2.548* 
(1.555) 
0.504 
(0.928) 
Wave 2 0.341*** 
(0.120) 
0.173* 
(0.089) 
0.253** 
(0.120) 
0.164* 
(0.097) 
Wave 3 0.554*** 
(0.204) 
0.129 
(0.175) 
0.384** 
(0.179) 
0.253 
(0.167) 
Excluded Exogenous Variables 
Domestic Violence:     
     Unilateral Divorce -0.116 
(0.090) 
-0.161 
(0.098) 
0.002 
(0.101) 
-0.131 
(0.085) 
     Single Sex Ratio -0.184 
(0.932) 
0.455 
(0.582) 
1.068* 
(0.645) 
0.586 
(0.601) 
     Religion *** * *** ** 
Working:     
     Mother Worked 0.061 
(0.092) 
-0.007 
(0.054) 
0.050 
(0.085) 
0.004 
(0.091) 
     Birth Rate 0.004 
(0.030) 
0.008 
(0.054) 
-0.013 
(0.020) 
0.016 
(0.025) 
     Predicted Wage -0.157 
(0.225) 
-0.305 
(0.188) 
0.108 
(0.198) 
0.412** 
(0.168) 
Number of Observations 
Log pseudolikelihood 
Wald test of Rho=0: 
N = 2920 
L = -1380.7 
Rho = 0.213 
 
 
p-value = 0.027 
N = 3070 
L = -1175.2 
Rho = -0.241 
 
 
p-value = 0.007 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors clustered on birth state in parentheses unless otherwise noted. 
Individual dummies indicating religious denomination were also included in the domestic violence equation. The 
significance test is a test of all dummies being jointly equal to 0.  
All Income values are in constant 1988 dollars. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels. 
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Table 2A.2: Model Selection Coefficient Estimates (Domestic Violence Effect Model) 
 Low Income Households High Income Households 
Variable Coefficient 
(D.V. Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(Working Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(D.V. Eq.) 
Coefficient 
(Working Eq.) 
Domestic Violence  -0.602 
(0.735) 
 -1.213 
(0.914) 
Age -0.022*** 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.018*** 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
Education -0.014** 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.014) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
Number of Children 0.021 
(0.029) 
-0.017 
(0.019) 
-0.010 
(0.027) 
0.004 
(0.032) 
Black -0.053 
(0.115) 
-0.060 
(0.081) 
0.120 
(0.120) 
0.052 
(0.131) 
Hispanic 0.210 
(0.149) 
-0.066 
(0.121) 
0.191 
(0.259) 
-0.088 
(0.152) 
Cohabiting 1.455*** 
(0.201) 
0.286 
(0.267) 
1.895*** 
(0.218) 
0.697 
(0.490) 
Log Spouse Income -2.91x10-4 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.030 
(0.097) 
-0.076 
(0.070) 
Northeast -0.174 
(0.113) 
0.138 
(0.106) 
0.039 
(0.105) 
0.136 
(0.099) 
South -0.202* 
(0.106) 
0.032 
(0.082) 
-0.200* 
(0.113) 
0.040 
(0.092) 
West -0.314** 
(0.154) 
0.190 
(0.126) 
-0.004 
(0.139) 
0.180 
(0.112) 
Unemployment Rate 0.012 
(0.045) 
0.022 
(0.028) 
0.030 
(0.036) 
-0.017 
(0.029) 
% Women Working -0.087 
(1.126) 
1.212* 
(0.723) 
-2.245* 
(1.356) 
0.085 
(0.887) 
Wave 2 0.313*** 
(0.112) 
0.192* 
(0.101) 
0.281** 
(0.122) 
0.166* 
(0.095) 
Wave 3 0.445*** 
(0.127) 
0.174 
(0.196) 
0.479*** 
(0.144) 
0.222 
(0.158) 
Excluded Exogenous Variables 
Domestic Violence:     
     Unilateral Divorce -0.088 
(0.094) 
 0.016 
(0.099) 
 
     Single Sex Ratio -0.130 
(0.938) 
 0.994 
(0.618) 
 
     Religion ***  ***  
Working:     
     Mother Worked  0.009 
(0.052) 
 0.011 
(0.092) 
     Birth Rate  0.008 
(0.024) 
 0.009 
(0.025) 
     Predicted Wage  0.292* 
(0.169) 
 0.371** 
(0.141) 
X2 test: 
Excluded Exogenous Variables Jointly = 0 
     p-values in parentheses 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.490) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.124) 
Number of Observations 
Log pseudolikelihood 
Wald test of Rho=0: 
N = 2920 
L = -1408.7 
Rho = 0.351 
 
 
p-value = 0.032 
N = 3070 
L = -1192.1 
Rho = -0.613 
 
 
p-value = 0.021 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors clustered on birth state in parentheses unless otherwise noted. 
Individual dummies indicating religious denomination were also included in the domestic violence equation. The 
significance test is a test of all dummies being jointly equal to 0.  
All Income values are in constant 1988 dollars. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels. 
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Chapter 3: “Do the Job Satisfaction Returns to Education Differ Between Black 
and White Workers?” 
 
Introduction 
 The gap in educational attainment between races has been an issue that 
policymakers have been attempting to address for the past several decades, and while 
large strides have been made to close the gap a large disparity still exists. Institutions 
emerged in recent decades that attempt to close this gap in educational attainment 
(scholarship programs, grants, affirmative action educational policies etc.) and have 
met with obvious success in increasing the overall percentage of minorities holding 
degrees. In fact the percentage of black workers who held a bachelor’s degree has 
more than doubled since 1980, but there is still a disparity of over 10 percentage 
points between black and white individuals holding a bachelor’s degree (Digest of 
Education Statistics, 2009). Since the gap does not appear to be closing, an important 
question to ask is whether other factors that these institutions do not address are 
affecting the educational decisions of minorities.  
 This paper attempts to analyze the returns to education and how the returns 
differ between black and white workers in an attempt to explain why the educational 
attainment gap does not appear to be closing. Thus far the literature has focused on 
the difference in the monetary returns to education between blacks and whites. The 
general consensus is that black workers tend to earn higher monetary returns to 
education than white workers. If this were the case, black workers would have more 
incentive to invest in higher levels of education than white workers, and through the 
emergence of institutions that seek to increase access to blacks and other minorities 
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we would expect that the gap in educational attainment would be decreasing. This 
clearly is not the case.  
 One potential reason why the estimated returns to education to date are not 
consistent with the observed gap in educational attainment is that the monetary returns 
to education are only one part of the story. While increasing one’s earnings potential 
is likely the primary motivator for pursuing higher education, other considerations 
also exist. Higher education is often sought by individuals to enable them to find a 
more satisfying job and it is likely that educational attainment affects job satisfaction 
differently for black and white workers. Since job satisfaction measures how satisfied 
one is with not only the pay but the other aspects of the job, it may be a better 
candidate to measure the returns to education by. If black individuals are found to 
have lower job satisfaction returns to education on average then this may at least 
partially explain why we still observe a sizable gap in educational attainment between 
races. After all, a person might not choose to spend four more years in school if they 
would be happier at their current job. 
 The purpose of this paper is to extend the literature on the racial differences in 
the monetary returns to education to a more general measure: the job satisfaction 
returns to education. Ultimately the results of the analysis carried out indicate that 
black workers do indeed have lower job satisfaction returns to education than white 
workers. In fact, education has a negative net impact for black workers after 
approximately a high school diploma is received, which suggest that there is little 
incentive for blacks to invest further in education beyond the high school level which 
is consistent with the observed attainment gap. 
 Further, we find that education has a positive impact on the ability to transition 
into new employment where job satisfaction is higher for white workers, but very 
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little net impact on this ability to transition to a new better job for black workers. This 
finding offers further evidence that hints at why blacks do indeed choose lower levels 
of education than whites on average. 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Part 2 provides a brief 
review of the relevant literature, Part 3 discusses the data and methodology that will 
be used, Part 4 presents the results of the study, and Part 5 concludes. 
 
1. Literature Review 
1.1 Monetary Returns to Education 
 A large part of the decision to invest in education is arguably whether the 
monetary benefits to investing outweigh the costs. If education is too costly and does 
not yield a wage that is sufficiently higher than one’s current wage, there are no 
incentives for the individual to invest. The monetary returns to education literature 
consistently finds positive returns to education, though the magnitudes of these 
returns vary from study to study (see Card [1999] for example).  
 The analysis of the monetary returns to education has also been carried out 
across different demographic groups including across races. Interestingly, the 
literature indicates that black individuals have higher monetary returns to education 
than their white counterparts (see Welch [1973] for example). This idea has also been 
analyzed using sheepskin effects instead of simply using years of education. Belman 
and Heywood (1991), for example, find that black and other minority workers tend to 
have higher returns to signals of high productivity, namely higher levels of education, 
than their white counterparts and the reverse is true for signals of low productivity 
(low education levels). Regardless of which method of analysis is used, the 
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conclusion remains the same. Black workers tend to have higher monetary returns to 
education than white workers. 
 If this truly is the case, and the monetary returns to education are the only 
basis for making educational level decisions, then this literature would predict that 
black individuals would have higher incentives to invest in human capital than white 
individuals. Further, since scholarship and grant programs, among other institutions, 
have actively increased access to education for blacks and other minority groups for 
the past several decades, we would expect that the gap in attainment should have 
narrowed, but as we have seen this is not the case. There must be other factors in 
addition to the monetary returns that individuals are taking into account when making 
their educational decisions, such as the ability to do more interesting work, better 
fringe benefits, or better working conditions. Thus, an analysis based on a composite 
variable that takes all of these factors into account would give us a much more 
complete picture. This paper has argued that a candidate for such a variable is job 
satisfaction. 
1.2 Education and Job Satisfaction 
 Job Satisfaction returns to education are arguably more useful in the decision-
making process in that the wage premium associated with higher levels of education 
may be misleading; it is very possible that higher education levels could produce large 
monetary gains, but the work itself is not satisfying at all. The education premium on 
job satisfaction might therefore be more useful in explaining patters in individual 
choices about education levels. Clearly there are some valid concerns with using job 
satisfaction, a subjective variable, to evaluate the “returns to education”, but as 
Hamermesh (2001: p.2) points out “Any study of nonwage monetary or even 
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nonmonetary returns will necessarily ignore some non-pecuniary aspects of these 
returns…Only one measure, the satisfaction that workers derive from their jobs, might 
be viewed as reflecting how they react to the entire changing panoply of job 
characteristics.” If we think that low levels of job satisfaction may induce workers to 
change certain behaviors (i.e. to go back to school or to seek a new job), then the 
effects of education on job satisfaction, while an imperfect measure, will at least 
provide a more realistic picture of the education level decision. 
An important factor in determining the effects of education on job satisfaction 
is individual expectations. The way in which individuals form their expectations of 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns to education will influence whether or not higher 
levels of education will actually result in higher levels of job satisfaction. It is 
generally thought that increased levels of education increase the expectations of 
individuals on the various rewards of a job and that higher levels of these rewards are 
needed to satisfy them, but that education also increases one’s ability to obtain a job 
with these characteristics (Martin and Shehan, 1989). Depending on whether these 
expectations are met, education may have a positive or negative effect on job 
satisfaction, and we may also think that these expectations differ by race. 
It may be reasonable to assume that a black and a white worker with similar 
characteristics and the same education level would expect the same job 
characteristics. However, their ability to obtain jobs with these characteristics may be 
different either because of discrimination in the labor market or differences in job 
searching ability.  
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1.3 Race and Job Satisfaction 
 Although determinants of job satisfaction may be different across races, few 
studies have analyzed the job satisfaction gap between blacks and whites. Instead 
most have focused on the differences in job satisfaction between other demographic 
groups such as men and women, although many studies include an indicator variable 
for race. In the U.K. Clark and Oswald (1996) and Sloane and Williams (2000) find 
that black workers tend to have lower levels of job satisfaction than white workers, 
but only Sloane and Williams find race to be significant in predicting job satisfaction. 
Bartel (1981) and Clark (1997) on the other hand find that black workers enjoy higher 
levels of job satisfaction on average. Using U.S. data, Bartel finds that race has 
become more important over time in predicting job satisfaction while Clark finds that 
race is insignificant in predicting job satisfaction. 
 Bartel (1981) which analyzes the differences in job satisfaction across races, 
but does not allow education’s effects on job satisfaction to vary by race. She 
estimates probits over a period of time on pooled data and attempts to estimate the 
effect of race on the full wage (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) and the direct effect of 
race on job satisfaction. The results of Bartel’s study suggest that the effect of race on 
job satisfaction is positive (as predicted) and that race is becoming increasingly more 
important in predicting job satisfaction. Interestingly education’s effects on job 
satisfaction levels in this model, with the exception of the earliest time period, are all 
positive and insignificant; in the first period education’s returns to job satisfaction are 
negative and significant.  
Clearly a consensus has yet to be reached in the literature not only on the 
direction of the effects of race on job satisfaction, but whether race is even significant 
in determining job satisfaction levels as well. 
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2. Data and Methodology 
 The data used in this study is from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
1979, using the survey years between 1989 and 2002 (10 years in total). Throughout 
the survey years included, the range of ages was between 24 and 45: individuals who 
were just starting their careers as well as individuals who were well established in 
their careers. In this survey, the question pertaining to job satisfaction is phrased as 
follows: “How do/did you feel about your job/assignment with (employer)? Do/did 
you like it very much, like it fairly well, dislike it somewhat, or dislike it very much?” 
In order to obtain easily interpretable results, the response values were reduced to a 
binary variable taking a value of 1 if an individual reported liking their job very much, 
and a value of 0 otherwise.
5
 Education in this data set is measured as the total number 
of completed years of education and these values range from zero to twenty years. 
Other variables are included to control for determinants of pecuniary and non-
pecuniary rewards, as well as personal and work related characteristics. The sample 
used has been restricted to include only black and white workers who are not self-
employed. Summary statistics for the variables can be found in Table 1. 
 Note that the binary job satisfaction score was also compared at different 
levels of education: no high school (NO HS), high school diploma (HS), some college 
(SC), bachelor’s degree (B), and graduate work (G). These categories were 
determined by the years of schooling completed and were grouped as follows: <12 
years, 12 years, between 12 and 16 years, and >16 years respectively. Thus it is not 
certain that a degree was actually obtained, if applicable. Education levels are also 
                                                 
5
 The binary job satisfaction variable is defined in this way because most job satisfaction scores were 
3’s and 4’s and almost the entire sample was evenly split between the two scores, thus not much is lost 
in using a binary variable. Several ordered probit models were run to check whether the results still 
hold and the results were found to be nearly identical to the ones used for this analysis. For ease of 
interpretation the results of the probit models will be reported, but the results of the ordered probit 
models are also available upon request. 
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compared at both job satisfaction levels. These comparisons can also be found in 
Table 3.1.  
 We can clearly see that white workers are more satisfied than black workers 
on average and that white workers are more likely to receive higher wages. 
Conversely black workers are more likely to be members of unions, which has 
typically been found to correspond to lower levels of job satisfaction (see Artz [2010] 
for example). We can also observe that for every education level, except no high 
school education, white workers have higher levels of job satisfaction than black 
workers and that average job satisfaction is not strictly increasing in educational 
attainment, but it is uncertain whether this is due to the effects of education or if it is a 
result of differences in average earnings, benefits, and/or other characteristics between 
black and white workers. 
 Various probit models were run to examine the interaction between education 
and job satisfaction. The first four are baseline models that allow us to compare our 
estimates of education and race’s effects on job satisfaction with those found in the 
larger literature. Models 5 through 8 also include an interacted term for education and 
race. This allows us to see the differences in education’s effects on job satisfaction 
between races and to see how race’s impact on job satisfaction varies across education 
levels.
6
 Finally, a set of other regressions indicate the robustness of the education-race 
relationships to other variable specifications.  
 
 
                                                 
6
 Equivalent models were run using splines at several “educational milestones” or degree levels as 
defined in the summary statistics discussion that follows. The end results indicated that the effect of 
education does not change by degree level, even for the very basic initial models. Thus, the story seems 
to be a years of schooling story instead of a degree level story. 
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3. Results 
3.1 Basic Results 
 Table 3.2 contains the results of the four baseline specifications. The first 
model estimated simply measures the relationship between education, race, and job 
satisfaction using a probit model that controls only for gender and age. Model 2 adds 
controls for personal characteristics to see if the relationship persists after controlling 
for marital status, whether the respondent lives in a rural or urban area, and family 
size. Models 3 and 4 add in monetary and non-monetary work related characteristics, 
respectively. Since the variable specifications here are similar to ones found in the 
literature, the results of these models can also be compared with those of the literature 
to see if the findings are consistent. 
 All four models estimate a negative and significant effect of race on job 
satisfaction. This result is fairly consistent with the majority of the literature on job 
satisfaction. In general, being black has been found to be negatively related to job 
satisfaction, though most estimates have been insignificant (see Sloane and Williams 
[2000], or Clark, Oswald, and Warr [1996] for example). This negative and 
significant effect of race on job satisfaction contrasts, however, with the positive and 
significant effects estimated in Bartel’s (1981) earlier work. 
 We also observe that education has a positive and significant relationship with 
job satisfaction in all four specifications. This suggests that education does have an 
impact on job satisfaction beyond the ability to “buy” better working conditions. The 
literature on education’s impact on job satisfaction has been quite divided with some 
researchers finding a positive effect, some finding negative effects, and other finding 
insignificant effects. In general we would expect education to increase one’s job 
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satisfaction because it increases the ability to obtain better wages, benefits and to do 
more interesting work, but once these are controlled for there may be little extra 
influence on job satisfaction. 
 The four baseline models estimate therefore seem consistent with theory and 
the existing literature, but what happens when we allow education’s impact to vary by 
race? This analysis is shown in Table 3.3. Models 5 through 8 add an interacted term 
for race and education to the specifications from Table 3.2. 
3.2 Results of Interacted Models 
 Model 5 shows that the coefficient on the race indicator has switched signs 
when the interacted terms are included. This indicates that black workers have a 
higher baseline level of job satisfaction (job satisfaction if the individual has no 
education) than white workers, but that job satisfaction is decreasing in education for 
black workers. In particular we find that being black is positively associated with job 
satisfaction until education reaches 6.7-10.1 years, but the effect becomes negative if 
education goes beyond that level.
7
 In other words, if a black individual chooses to 
further his/her education beyond the high school level it will actually have a negative 
impact on job satisfaction.  
This result is consistent with an expectations story. Exposure to higher 
education increases one’s expectation of not only the pecuniary aspects of a job, but 
the non-pecuniary aspects as well. It could be argued then that black workers’ 
expectations of these job characteristics are increasing in education to a point that 
                                                 
7
 This is determined by finding the level of education at which the marginal effect of the race indicator 
and the marginal effect of the interacted term are equal. The range given above is the range of values 
obtained when carrying this analysis out for all four model specifications. 
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they are not being met, thereby decreasing their satisfaction with their work (see Clark 
[1997], and Clark and Oswald [1996] for a discussion on expectations). 
 Another interesting result of these models is that education’s effect on job 
satisfaction is positive and significant for white workers under Models 5 through 7 
(and insignificant under Model 8), but the net effect for black workers varies by 
model specification. The effect of education for blacks appears to be positive when 
only personal characteristics are controlled for, but becomes negative and significant 
when we begin to control for work-related characteristics.  
This result lends some more support for the idea that expectations are driving 
the negative effect of education on job satisfaction for black workers. Because 
education is insignificant for white workers in Model 8, education is not adding 
anything significant to job satisfaction beyond what it adds to work related 
characteristics. Since the interacted term for black workers is significant though, we 
see that education still plays a significant role for black workers even after controlling 
for work related characteristics. In fact, each additional year of education predicts a 
lower probability that a black worker reports being very satisfied with his or her job 
by about 1.1 percent. This means that obtaining a bachelor’s degree, something that 
typically takes four years or more, could lower his or her chances of being very 
satisfied in their job by nearly five percent. This implies that education is still 
decreasing job satisfaction for black individuals even after we account for how it 
affects job characteristics, which is consistent with unmet expectations about the 
worker’s job. 
 Table 3.3 also includes Wald Tests of whether the education variables are 
jointly equal to zero as well as the race variables. The results of these tests indicate 
that while education may not be significant in determining job satisfaction for white 
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workers in all model specifications, we cannot reject the hypothesis that education 
and racial interaction with education are jointly equal to zero under any model 
specification. 
3.3 Robustness Checks 
 We saw in the first part of the analysis that even in the midst of numerous 
personal and job related characteristics there still exists a significant difference in 
education’s effects on job satisfaction between black and white workers. Four 
robustness checks were run to see if this relationship persists, the results of which can 
be found in Table 3.4.  
Model 9 attempts to get at a potential cause of these unmet expectations via 
including a term for an individual’s comparison wage. Clark (1996) was among the 
first to use comparison earnings in the analysis of job satisfaction and showed that not 
only is an individual’s income important in determining job satisfaction, but how the 
individual views their income in relation to what he/she believes they deserve (based 
on their characteristics) or in relation to what his/her peers earn is also important. A 
similar measure is included in this analysis to see if the gap in education’s returns 
disappears after accounting for some measure of individual “expectations” of wages. 
 This comparison wage variable measures the ratio of the respondent’s actual 
income and of what the worker would be predicted to earn if he/she were of the 
opposite race. The lower the value of this variable (either by a relative decrease in the 
individual’s wage or by an increase in the wages of those the individual compares 
his/her income to), the lower one’s job satisfaction is expected to be. Baxter (1973, 
1993) formalized this idea as relative deprivation. An individual will have some 
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expectations of what they should be earning given their education and background, 
and if these expectations are not met the worker will be less satisfied on average. 
 To create this variable, two standard wage regressions are estimated for black 
and white workers separately. Predicted wages were then generated for white 
individuals using the black earnings equation and similar predicted wages were 
created for black individuals. Finally, the ratio of the individual’s actual earnings 
versus their predicted earnings if they were of the other race is taken. This ratio is 
what is used in the analysis as the comparison wage. Because of colinearity concerns, 
this comparison wage will replace the respondent’s actual income in the analysis. 
 Interestingly, the coefficient on the comparison wage in Model 9 is positive 
and significant which agrees with Clark’s (1996) earlier findings, but the relationship 
between education, race, and job satisfaction that was estimated in Models 5 through 
8 still persists. 
 Another question that arises is that because blacks have higher levels of job 
satisfaction than whites at lower education levels, but the comparison is reversed after 
a high school diploma is received, perhaps part of what we are observing is a drop-out 
effect. Thus, the second robustness check estimates Model 9 only for individuals who 
have completed at least 12 years of education.  
The overall result is that our baseline group, individuals with only a high 
school diploma, experiences no significant differences in job satisfaction by race. This 
result makes sense because we are cutting out those black workers who were, on 
average, happier than their white counterparts, and starting at roughly the point where 
the two experience the same levels of job satisfaction. We also see that despite the 
fact that blacks and whites are starting from roughly equivalent levels of job 
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satisfaction, blacks do still receive lower job satisfaction returns to education than 
whites. 
The third robustness check run follows the work of Clark (1997), and asks if 
this persistent result has a gender component to it. The full model is thus run again, 
including interactions with gender and education, as well as gender and race. These 
results can be found in Table 3.4. 
 It appears that white women with low levels of education are more satisfied 
than their male counterparts, but black women are less satisfied. Further, the results 
indicate that women receive lower job satisfaction returns to education than men 
which agrees with the earlier findings of Clark (1997). We also notice that black 
females have lower levels of job satisfaction than their white counterparts, but that 
education’s effect on job satisfaction does not differ for black and white females. 
Finally, there is still a persistent difference in the job satisfaction returns to education 
between blacks and whites, and it does not appear that this effect varies by gender.  
 A final robustness check might be to include the AFQT score not only in the 
comparison wage equation but in the job satisfaction equation as well and to see if 
AFQT scores affect job satisfaction differently by race and/or by gender. Lang and 
Manove (2011) show that conditional on ability (AFQT scores) black individuals 
invest more in education and as such should out earn their white counterparts. 
However, they propose that because of statistical discrimination this does not 
necessarily happen. If these results are true, then at least part of the difference in the 
job satisfaction returns to education should be explained by differences in ability 
which would be consistent with an expectations story. 
 The results of this final specification can also be found in Table 3.4. We see 
that despite controlling for ability, black men have high job satisfaction than white 
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men when education and ability are low. However, this advantage in job satisfaction 
is gradually depleted as education and ability increase. We also see a similar result to 
our previous specification that while there do appear to be some differences between 
men and women, this effect does not differ significantly by race, suggesting again that 
most of the significant differences in the education returns to job satisfaction are 
between black and white men. 
 Finally, we see that white men enjoy a positive return to education, but receive 
lower job satisfaction when they are of higher ability. For black men, however, the net 
effect of education is negative, and while they too have lower levels of job 
satisfaction as ability increases, this reduction in satisfaction is higher for black men. 
These results make sense intuitively in light of Lang and Manove’s (2011) 
work. Higher levels of ability tend to lead individuals into higher levels of education, 
and if black individuals with a given ability level invest more than their white 
counterparts then it is also likely that their expectations of their job will be higher. 
Because of statistical discrimination in the hiring process, or other discriminatory 
practices in the work place, the expectations of these individuals may be unmet to a 
greater degree than their white counterparts and these unmet expectations are likely 
manifesting themselves in the form of lower levels of job satisfaction at higher 
education levels. 
 
4. Extension: Education’s Effect on the Ability to Transition to a Better Job 
 Earlier the idea was put forth that individuals may pursue higher education not 
only to obtain a better paying job, but to also obtain a job which they are happier with. 
We have now seen that education does indeed affect job satisfaction differently for 
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blacks and whites, and that black individuals see negative job satisfaction returns to 
education. This suggests that black individuals have fewer incentives in terms of job 
satisfaction to pursue higher levels of education, presumably because they expect that 
they will not see the benefit in the form of a better job, which is why we still observe 
a gap in educational attainment between blacks and whites. 
 A natural extension of these results would be to see how education affects the 
ability of an individual to move into a new job where their job satisfaction is higher 
and to see if this effect is different by race. To accomplish this, a Cox model of 
proportional hazards is run on the data where a “failure” is defined as a person having 
a new job at the time of interview and reporting being more satisfied than they were at 
their previous job. Here the full job satisfaction variable is used in lieu of the binary 
job satisfaction variable used in the previous analysis. Because the ability to transition 
to a new job that one likes better is likely higher when one starts at a lower job 
satisfaction level (since there are more opportunities for improvement) the Cox model 
is stratified by the individual’s current job satisfaction score. Note that because the 
sample from each year contains only individuals who were employed at the time of 
the interview and had a job to report satisfaction for some individuals are missing data 
for one or more survey years and are excluded from the present analysis. Also note 
that the analysis does not include those individuals whose job satisfaction scores are 
4’s since they are unable to transition to a new job that they like any better. The 
results of this model can be found in Table 3.5. 
 The results indicate that education has a positive effect on the ability to 
transition to a new job with higher job satisfaction for white workers. Specifically we 
find that for each additional year of education there will be roughly a four percent 
increase in the likelihood of moving into a new job with higher job satisfaction. For 
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black men, however, education seems to have no net effect on the likelihood of 
transition. We also see that there is no significant impact of race on this transition 
ability at low levels of education, but the ability to obtain a new better job moves in 
opposite directions as education increases with white men being more able and black 
men being less able to transition.  
 A final related analysis would be to see how education affects the initial 
placement in jobs of different satisfaction levels differently for black and white 
workers. To accomplish this the job placement in the first survey year, 1989, is used 
as a proxy for the respondent’s first job and a multinomial probit model is run to 
analyze how education affects this initial placement.
8
 Results of this estimation are 
presented in Table 3.6. 
 We can see that education significantly increases the likelihood of being 
placed in a job with a job satisfaction score of a 2 or 3 for black workers relative to a 
score of 4, but that education does not significantly impact this placement into less 
satisfying jobs for white workers. Further, the predicted probability of being placed in 
an “initial” job with a job satisfaction score below 4 is higher for black workers than it 
is for white workers at every score, but the predicted probability of being placed in an 
initial job with the highest job satisfaction score of 4 is higher for white workers. 
 These findings support our previous results, and we have now seen that not 
only does higher education negatively affect whether a black individual will be 
satisfied with his/her present job, but it also does not help in their initial job placement 
in terms of job satisfaction nor does it aid their ability to transition to a new job that 
they like better. The implication of these findings is that there appear to be negative 
                                                 
8
 In this survey year the average age ranged from 24 to 32. The multinomial probit model was restricted 
to only individuals who were 26 years of age or younger who are those individuals who are most likely 
to still be in their first job and indeed are still at the beginning of their career.  
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returns to education for black workers and that this is perhaps why they are choosing 
lower levels of education than their white counterparts. The reason for this is still 
unclear. It could be due to discrimination in the hiring process or in the workplace 
once a person is hired, but it could also be due to a number of other factors such as 
white works being able to take advantage of a wider professional network.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 This paper attempted to determine whether there was a significant difference 
in job satisfaction returns to education across races. In each model estimated it was 
found that black workers with no education were more satisfied with their jobs than 
their white counterparts, but that increasing levels of education diminished this effect 
until it eventually became negative (at or before obtaining a high school diploma). 
This negative relationship between education and job satisfaction for black workers is 
consistent with the observed persistent educational attainment gap between black and 
white individuals in a way that the monetary returns to education literature is not. If 
we believe that higher expected job satisfaction is one of the motivators for pursuing 
higher education and lower expected job satisfaction is one deterrent of pursuing 
higher education then these results may lend some insight as to why we might still 
observe a sizable gap in educational attainment. 
 We also established that while education has a positive impact on the ability to 
transition into new work that is more satisfying for white workers, education actually 
does not aid this transition ability for black workers. Further, higher levels of 
education appear to increase the likelihood of having an initial job placement in a job 
with lower levels of job satisfaction for black workers. This finding lends further 
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support to the claim that lower expected gains in job satisfaction for black individuals 
may be one of the driving forces behind why we observe a persistent educational 
attainment gap between blacks and whites. 
 Now that it has been established in this paper that a significant difference in 
the job satisfaction returns to education exists between black workers and white 
workers until ability (which negatively affects job satisfaction) is accounted for, the 
next logical step is to attempt to determine why this relationship exists. A further 
study of the differences in different aspects of job satisfaction between black and 
white workers could help to pinpoint where this negative effect of education and 
ability for black workers is coming from. Do black workers get fewer fringe benefits 
than white workers, is their work less interesting, do they work more hours, is there 
some form of discrimination going on in the workplace? Knowing why black workers 
are less happy on average with their work could tell us if there is anything that can be 
done to close the job satisfaction gap. This in turn should at least diminish the gap in 
education’s effects on job satisfaction and potentially decrease the educational 
attainment gap in the long run. 
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Tables 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable White Black Difference 
Job Satisfaction 3.349 
(0.005) 
3.249 
(0.007) 
0.100*** 
(0.008) 
Binary Job Satisfaction 0.456 
(0.003) 
0.393 
(0.005) 
0.063*** 
(0.006) 
Job Satisfaction (No HS: 2,589 obs.) 0.423 
(0.012) 
0.429 
(0.017) 
-0.006 
(0.021) 
Job Satisfaction (HS: 14,288 obs.) 0.420 
(0.005) 
0.370 
(0.007) 
0.050*** 
(0.009) 
Job Satisfaction (SC: 8,272 obs.) 0.474 
(0.007) 
0.382 
(0.009) 
0.091*** 
(0.011) 
Job Satisfaction (B: 5,589 obs.) 0.465 
(0.008) 
0.422 
(0.014) 
0.043*** 
(0.016) 
Job Satisfaction (G: 3,375 obs.) 0.560 
(0.009) 
0.499 
(0.020) 
0.061*** 
(0.022) 
Education 13.640 
(0.016) 
13.245 
(0.020) 
0.395*** 
(0.027) 
Education (JS = 0) 13.460 
(0.020) 
13.191 
(0.025) 
0.269*** 
(0.034) 
Education (JS = 1) 13.854 
(0.024) 
13.328 
(0.035) 
0.526*** 
(0.045) 
Hrs./Day 8.519 
(0.012) 
8.339 
(0.016) 
0.180*** 
(0.021) 
Health Insurance 0.823 
(0.002) 
0.800 
(0.004) 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
Retirement Plan 0.675 
(0.003) 
0.680 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
Flexible Hours 0.521 
(0.003) 
0.503 
(0.005) 
0.018*** 
(0.006) 
Training 0.561 
(0.003) 
0.532 
(0.005) 
0.030*** 
(0.006) 
Union 0.136 
(0.002) 
0.193 
(0.004) 
-0.057*** 
(0.004) 
Public Sector 0.201 
(0.003) 
0.292 
(0.004) 
-0.090*** 
(0.005) 
Weeks Tenure 266.756 
(1.620) 
237.407 
(2.343) 
29.348*** 
(2.904) 
Log Income 10.180 
(0.005) 
9.875 
(0.009) 
0.305*** 
(0.010) 
Weeks Unemployed 1.211 
(0.031) 
2.301 
(0.070) 
-1.090*** 
(0.066) 
AFQT score 57.545 
(0.174) 
29.050 
(0.222) 
28.495*** 
(0.301) 
Family Size 2.922 
(0.009) 
3.113 
(0.166) 
-0.191*** 
(0.018) 
Married 0.645 
(0.003) 
0.408 
(0.005) 
0.237*** 
(0.006) 
Urban 0.730 
(0.003) 
0.852 
(0.003) 
-0.122*** 
(0.005) 
N = 34,112 
Proportion of Sample 
 
0.697 
 
0.303 
 
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significant differences at 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence respectively. 
Income is measured in constant 2000 dollars. 
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Table 3.2: Results of Job Satisfaction Probit Regressions for Baseline Models (No Racial Interactions)  
Variable 
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) 
Marginal 
Effect 
Marginal 
Effect 
Marginal 
Effect 
Marginal 
Effect 
Black -0.060*** 
(0.006) 
-0.053*** 
(0.006) 
-0.056** 
(0.006) 
-0.048*** 
(0.006) 
Education 0.014*** 
(0.001) 
0.014*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Female 0.025*** 
(0.005) 
0.025*** 
(0.005) 
0.038*** 
(0.006) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
Age 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Personal Characteristics 
 
    
Work Characteristics 
 
    
Non-Monetary Characteristics 
 
    
N=34,112 
Predicted Prob. 
 
0.437 
 
0.437 
 
0.436 
 
0.434 
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Table 3.3: Results of Job Satisfaction Probit Regressions for Interacted Models  
Variable 
(Model 5)  (Model 6)  (Model 7)  (Model 8) 
Marginal 
Effect 
 Marginal 
Effect 
 Marginal 
Effect 
 Marginal 
Effect 
Black 0.067* 
(0.037) 
 0.080** 
(0.037) 
 0.093** 
(0.037) 
 0.111*** 
(0.038) 
Education 0.016*** 
(0.001) 
 0.017*** 
(0.001) 
 0.010*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.002 
(0.002)) 
Black x Education -0.010*** 
(0.003) 
 -0.010*** 
(0.003) 
 -0.011*** 
(0.003) 
 -0.011*** 
(0.007) 
X
2
 test: 
Race Variables 
Education Variables 
 
 
116.48*** 
156.17*** 
  
87.13*** 
158.81*** 
  
96.65*** 
46.13*** 
  
74.65*** 
30.02*** 
Female 0.026*** 
(0.005) 
 0.026*** 
(0.005) 
 0.039*** 
(0.006) 
 0.016** 
(0.006) 
Age 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 0.003** 
(0.001) 
 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Personal Characteristics 
 
       
Work Characteristics 
 
       
Non-Monetary Characteristics 
 
       
Comparison Wage        
N=34,112 
Predicted Prob. 
 
0.437 
  
0.437 
  
0.436 
  
0.434 
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence respectively. 
Year dummies indicating survey year also included in each model specification. 
Income values are in constant 2000 dollars. 
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Table 3.4: Job Satisfaction Probit Regressions for Robustness Check Models (Model 9 is base model)  
Variable 
Model 9 (Model 9 with 
No HS dropouts) 
(Model 9 with 
Female Interactions) 
(Model 9 with  
AFQT Interactions) 
Marginal  
Effect 
Marginal 
Effect 
Marginal 
Effect 
Marginal 
Effect 
Comparison Wage 0.021*** 
(0.004) 
0.024*** 
(0.004) 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
0.021*** 
(0.004) 
Black 0.121*** 
(0.038) 
0.057 
(0.045) 
0.165*** 
(0.050) 
0.111** 
(0.055) 
Education -1.40x10-4 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Black x Education -0.012*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.014*** 
(0.004) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
Female 0.009 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
0.100*** 
(0.040) 
0.122*** 
(0.041) 
Female x Black   -0.141* 
(0.070) 
-0.106 
(0.077) 
Female x Education   -0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.009*** 
(0.004) 
Female x Black x Education   0.006 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
AFQT    -0.001*** 
(2.16x10-4) 
Black x AFQT    -0.001* 
(4.31x10-4) 
Female x AFQT    0.001* 
(3.17x10-4) 
Female x Black x AFQT    4.40x10-4 
    (0.001) 
X2 test: 
Race Variables 
Education Variables 
Female Variables 
AFQT Variables 
 
81.97*** 
25.44*** 
N/A 
N/A 
 
74.09*** 
6.34* 
N/A 
N/A 
 
112.82*** 
22.50*** 
35.26*** 
N/A 
 
136.72*** 
16.85*** 
42.64*** 
58.91*** 
Number of Observations 
Predicted Prob. 
34,112 
0.434 
31,523 
0.435 
34,112 
0.434 
34,112 
0.434 
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence respectively. 
Year dummies indicating survey year also included in each model specification. 
Income values are in constant 2000 dollars. 
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Table 3.5: Results of Cox Model of Proportional Hazards ("Failure" = Transitioning to New Job With 
Higher Job Satisfaction)  
Variable Hazard Ratio 
Education 1.042** 
(0.020) 
Black 0.672 
(0.742) 
Black x Education 0.961*** 
(0.015) 
Female 0.557 
(0.643) 
Female x 
Education 
1.001 
(0.004) 
N=857 
Log likelihood = -1528.7 
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence 
respectively. 
Model is stratified by current job satisfaction score. 
The model has been restricted to include only those with current job 
satisfaction scores of 3 or below (those that actually can transition to better 
jobs). 
The full set of controls is used in estimating this model, but results are 
omitted from the table. 
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Table 3.6: Results of Multinomial Probit Model of Job Satisfaction at "Initial" Job  
Variable Job Satisfaction = 1 
(Coefficient) 
Job Satisfaction = 2 
(Coefficient) 
Job Satisfaction = 3 
(Coefficient) 
Black -1.070 
(0.754) 
-0.543 
(0.521) 
-0.337 
(0.376) 
Education 0.032 
(0.040) 
-0.014 
(0.029) 
-0.010 
(0.020) 
Black x Education 0.090 
(0.056) 
0.078** 
(0.039) 
0.050* 
(0.028) 
N = 1353 
Predicted Prob. (Black) 
Predicted Prob. (White) 
 
0.020 
0.019 
 
0.085 
0.059 
 
0.513 
0.462 
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence respectively. 
The full set of controls is used in estimating this model, but results are omitted from the table. 
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